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ABSTRACf 
The division of North and South Korea since World War II has been 
solidified by continuing hostility and confrontation. The growing heterogeneity of 
the two political systems constitutes a serious obstacle to national unification. The 
present hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an 
amicable and cooperative relationship. 
This thesis attempts to ascertain the unification policies of South and North 
Korea in order to project the future relations of the two countries. For this purpose, 
the study examines the inter-dependence between international and domestic 
politics in shaping the two Koreas' unification policies and tries to illuminate the 
major factors contributing to changing tactics and strategies in the quest for 
unification. 
The North and South Koreans have pursued diametrically opposed 
unification policies. The North Korean regime's ultimate aim has been to 
overthrow the government of South Korea and to reunify the peninsula under 
communist rule. On the other hand, the unification policy of South Korea has 
always called for a step-by-step approach, beginning with the recurring of a lasting 
peace, the easing of tension, and the restoration of trust, thereby building the 
foundations of national unification. 
v 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the first half of the 20th century, Korea lost its independe
nce and suffered 
great fiustration and hwniliation under Japanese colonization due t
o its failure to muster its 
inherent national capabilities to cope with the changing interna
tional situation. As a 
consequence of Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Korea w
as divided by the victors 
and suffered a serious war. Tragically, the Jand still remains divi
ded even though it has 
been aJmost fifty years since it was hberated from colonial subjugation. Although the C
old 
War ended in 1989-90, Korea continues to be the last battlefield of
 the fonner Cold War. 
Relations between South and North Korea are bound to ente
r a new phase 
following the 1994 death of Kim D- Sung who had ruled North
 Korea for nearly five 
decades. Having run into the limitations of its socialist system th
at has led to increasing 
international isolation and mmmting economic woes, North Kor
ea will aJmost certainly 
have to attempt a major transition as it readjusts its post-Kim D-Sung power structw"e.
1 
Although many books and articles concerning Korean unific
ation have been 
published, most of them emphasize the expressed policies of S
outh and North Korea 
without offering positive suggestions for unification or legal 
analysis for unification 
planning. This is understandable, given the possibility that Korean 
unification might not be 
easily achieved in the foreseeable future under the present circwnsta
nces. 
However, Korean unification is a prerequisite to the developme
nt of the Korean 
nation as a democratic country in order for it to cany out its proper
 role in the future of the 
world. The Korean nation, with a population of over sixty millio
n people and a cultural 
tradition spanning thousands of years, has not taken its proper place 
in the modem world 
due to the tragic national division imposed by outside powers. 
1Korean National Unification Board" A New Tack for Unity"(August 15, 1994), p. 7. 
Geographically situated among the major powers of the world, Korea has struggled 
for survival throughout most of its history. Korea's historical experience shows that 
Korean survival and prosperity are not necessarily guaranteed through a balanced policy 
toward the major powers, but may be guaranteed by becoming a major power. Korean 
unification is a prerequisite for reaching this goal. It is essential for the two Korean states 
to seek the means for unification and to fonnulate a legal basis for this national task. To 
this end, a brief sUIVey of South and North Korean unification policies and various related 
facts will be examined. The legal situation of a divided Korea will also be analyzed. 
Finally, in light of this research, some feasible methods for Korean unification will be 
suggested. 
Germany's Berlin Wall and Korea's 155-mile long Annistice Line, epitomized by 
Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), have been the most conspicuous symbolic 
sites of the bipolar division of the Eastern and Western Blocs since World War ll. The 
Korean Peninsula has remained a dangerous conflict zone- a powder keg- since the 1953 
Armistice Agreement ended the Korean War. 
Can the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the transfonnation of Eastern Europe 
affect North Korea, the most isolated and dogmatic country of the Communist bloc? The 
presently hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an 
amicable and cooperative relationship. Yemen failed to prevent a civil war after it was 
politically unified because it was unified hastily and superficially without having gone 
through a process of real reconciliation and cooperation. Can this influence North Korea to 
open its closed door and pursue the easing of tension and a peace settlement in the Korean 
Peninsula, and perhaps even ending the artificial division of Korea? What methods and 
proposals must emerge, and what conditions must be met, to realize these ends? 
2 
These difficult and ftmdamental questions preoccupy the thoughts of eveey Korean. 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the cWTent political and economic 
situation, and the policy direction of the North and South Korean Governments. My 
perspective is based, in part, on experiences gained while seiVing as chief of the Political 
and Economic Branch in the Republic of Korea I United States (ROKIUS) Combined 
Forces Command (CFC) under the :Ministly of National Defense from the Spring of 1982 
to the end of 1992. 
3 
II. THE CREATION OF A DIVIDED KOREA 
Wrth the ooconditional swnmder of Japan on August 15, 1945, the Korean people 
were liberated from the Japanese imperialists, and the Korean people rejoiced over this 
event. But it was not that simple. The Korean peninsula was liberated from the Japanese 
but it remained under the militaty occupation of the Soviet and American anned forces, 
with the 38th parallel designated as an arbitrary boundary line from which the Soviets on
 
the North side and the United States on the South side could process the repatriation
 of the 
Japanese prisoners. This arrangement was actually a by-product of the allied victory in 
World War ll. Korea's independence had already been promised by the Cairo Declaration 
of the allied powers in 1943. So the destiny of Korea was determined by external forces. 
And the emerging international cold war and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Korea and the Fa
r 
East resulted in the permanent division of the coootry. 
1broughout much of World War ll Korea had been a "forgotten nation". 
2 During 
the talks among the world powers, however, the seeds of future misfortune on the Korea
n 
peninsula were sown by agreements on a Korean trusteeship and division of the K
orean 
peninsula into the north and the south. In Apri11943, President Roosevelt and British
 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden agreed in their meeting that Korea "would fall under 
international trusteeship" and "the 1rustees might be the United States, the Soviet 
Union 
and China." A Korean 1rusteeship reflected the idea of Roosevelt, who had long thought 
that the liberated Asian colonial peoples should come ooder the tutelage of the G
reat 
Powers and be educated in democratic institutions. Meeting in Cairo in November 1
943 to 
plan the new order in Asia, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang IUU-shek declared that after 
the defeat of Japan "the three great powers are determined that in due course, Korea shall 
be free and independent." At Teheran Stalin endorsed this declaration. At Yalta, th
e 
2Robert T. Oliver, Korea, Fmgotten Nation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944), p.27. 
4 
anticipated entry of the USSR into the war in East Asia obliged Roosevelt and Churchill to 
make provision for Soviet interests in Northeast Asia. Subsequently and hastily, due to the 
sudden collapse of Japan, the Allied High Command agreed on the 38th parallel as the 
dividing line for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender in Korea. 3 
The Russians anived in northern Korea on August 12, 1945, after a lightning 
campaign in Manchuria. The Americans, preoccupied with Southeast Asia, China, and 
Japan, did not land in southern Korea until nearly a month later. From this beginning, the 
Korean Peninsula was divided, with the Russians in control in the North and the Americans 
in the South. Meeting in Moscow, December 1945, the Big Three (the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union ) agreed to move toward unification by establishing a 
provisional government under a four-power 1rusteeship - the Big Three plus China, then 
under Chiang Kai-shek. This denial of immediate independence infwiated South 
Koreans.4 
At this Yalta meeting, President Roosevelt said there might be a 1rusteeship for 
Korea composed of Soviet, American and Chinese representatives for at least twenty or 
thirty years. 5 But the division of the Korean peninsula, originally set up as a temporary 
measure to disarm a vanquished enemy, remained. At the Potsdam summit meeting among 
the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union in July 1945, which President Truman attended in 
place of the deceased Roosevelt, items agreed on at the cairo meeting with respect to the 
Korean question were reaffinned, thus emphasi.mlg again the principle that Korea should 
be made independent "in due course." 
3Dr. Claude A. Buss. "The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy", Hoover 
International Studies, (1982), p.30. 
4Ibid., p.31. 
5U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1955),p.984 
5 
As the war neared its end without any fum plan regarding the Korean question the 
Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. The United States then 
had to decide where to draw the dividing line for the U.S. and Soviet occupation zones on 
the Korean peninsula. Under these circumstances, the U.S. government, accepted the 
recommendation of Colonels C.H. Bonesteel (who later served as Commander-in-Chief of 
the United Nations Command in Korea) and Dean Rusk (later Secretary of State) of the 
General Staff of the War Department. They proposed that the Soviet Union be authorized 
to receive the Japanese surrender north of the 38th Parallel and the United States troops 
receive it south of that line. Under this arrangement, South and North Korea quickly 
developed into separate states following the Japanese surrender. The tenitorial division, 
imposed upon the Koreans against their will, hardened as time passed. From the very 
moment of division, South and North Korea began to pursue divergent roads. The 
interests of the United States and the Soviet Union were, of course, critically important. 
As the Cold war intensified, both Washington and Moscow worked against the evolving 
political forces in their respective occupation zones that might be unfriendly toward them. 
But when the United States and the Soviet Union set up temporary zones of military 
occupation, the 38th parallel became not only a boundary between the political spheres of 
influence of the two superpowers, but also, in time, a boundary between mutually 
incompatible political and socio-economic systems. 6 Since the inauguration of the North 
Korean regime in September 1948, the South and the North of a divided Korea have thus 
existed as independent entities with different political systems. South Korea developed into 
a western style democracy under the auspices of the United States: North Korea became a 
Communist satellite. 
6Dr. Park. Gun-Yang "Unification Policies ofNorth and South Korea" (1990) p. 17 
6 
By the early part of September, 1945, the Soviet Occupation Authority had 
established finn control throughout North Korea. Instead of setting up a military 
government, the Soviet Forces in North Korea let Korean Communists organize People's 
Committees throughout the entire area to conduct local administrative work. 7 The Soviet 
Occupation Authority also supported the Communists as an undisputed political force in 
North Korea. The Supreme People's Assembly for Korea held its first meeting in 
Pyongyang and ratified the constitution on September 3, 1948. Kim n Sung was fonnally 
instaDed as "Premier" of the North Korean regime that was officially established on 
September 9. 
In South Korea, however, the United States acted slowly. U.S. forces came to 
Korea as late as September 8, 1945, but unlike the Soviet occupation forces, the United 
States established a military government to maintain law and order. To understand this 
development, it is necessary to compare Washington's and Moscow's military occupation 
policies from 1945 to 1947. In 1945 the American Military Government (AMG) was 
unprepared for its occupation of South Korea. 8 It had neither plans nor trained personnel. 
The High Command (AMG) decided against any long range plans either for the Koreans 
or for the occupation personnel because it would be only a matter of months - six months, 
perhaps before the Army forces were withdrawn. However, the AMG was guided by the 
lofty principles of American democracy and quickly decided that South Korea would have 
a free and democratic system. This announcement encouraged a proliferation of political 
panies in South Korea (three hundred by August, 1946) and a division into the rightist and 
leftist groups. 9 The AMG recognized neither the new People's Republic (tentative 
71bid. p. 21 
syim, Yang Tack, "Jae Sam eui Tong D Bang An" (A Third Alternative for Unification in respect of 
Economic Integration), Seoul, Korea: The Economic Daily News Press (1993), pp. 76-79. 
'Hugh Burton, "Occupation Politics in Japan and Korea," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences, vol. 225 (January, 1948),p.153 
7 
government structure) nor the Korean Provisional Government (exile government) but 
supported a new bureaucracy (collaborators with Japan, the wealthy foreign-educated, and 
the Christians) against the Communists.l° From 1945-1947 the unpreparedness of the 
American military government and the power struggle among South Korean leaders 
created twmoil in South Korea. 
Unlike the U.S. military government, the Soviet anny had both a concrete plan and 
trained personnel. When the Soviet anny occupied North Korea, they canied out their 
plan using native Koreans as their instrwnent. Under the protection of the Soviet anny, 
Kim D-Sung's Soviet trained partisan detachments played an important role in 
implementing the Moscow plan. This group, which consisted of possibly two hundred 
men, had fought against the Japanese in Manchuria before 1940. With Kim D-Sung as 
leader, they had also served in the Soviet anny in Siberia from 1940 to 1945.11 The Soviet 
anny transferred all of its administrative power to the "people's committee" in the 
provinces. In Pyongyang "an Administrative Bureau of Five Provinces" was organized to 
consolidate and centralize control over the local people's committees. On August 28, 1946, 
the North Korean Workers Party was established by combining the Korean Communist 
Party and the New People's Party. The Korean Workers Party thus became the political 
and social organization which established a North Korean government modeled on the 
Russian system. 
During 1945, while both American and Russian military occupation forces 
maneuvered for political spheres of influence, the Korean problem was discussed in 
Moscow at the foreign ministers' leve~ with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great 
Britain participating. The final plan provided for placing Korea under a four-power 
10 J01.mgwon Alexander Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), pp.48-.5.5 
11North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1961). p. 101 
8 
trusteeship for five years. During this time, Korea was to be ruled by a provisional 
government established through the efforts of a Joint (U.S.-Soviet Union) Commission.12 
At the end of the five-year trusteeship, Korea was to be granted full independence. The 
trusteeship was deemed necessary due to the Korean people's lack of political experience. 
There had been no Korean self-government under Japanese rule. Strong opposition to the 
trusteeship proposal immediately sprang up in Korea. At first the Korean Communists 
were opposed to ttusteeship but they changed their position and launched a propaganda 
campaign "upholding" trusteeship.u In accordance with the decision of the Moscow 
conference, the first session of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission was held in Seoul on 
March 20, 1946. In May, however, the commission adjourned without results. The 
second session, held three weeks later, also failed. The main reason for the failure of the 
Commission lay in its inability to devise a formula for establishing a government for all of 
Korea. 
The United States insisted that all parties in both North and South Korea take part 
in a democratic election, while the Soviet Union wanted only those "democratic" parties 
that had a pro-Moscow orientation to parti.cipate.l4 As a result of this deadlock, the United 
States submitted the Korean question to the United Nations. On November 14, 1947, the 
United Nations established a UN Temporary Commission on Korea, and on January 12, 
1948 the Commission met in Seoul and reported to UN headquarters its inability to contact 
authorities in North Korea. Therefore, by a resolution of the United Nations, elections 
under UN supervision were held in South Korea only on May 10, 1948, which resulted in 
the formation of a Korean National Assembly, establishing the Government of the 
1ZCJeorge M. McCune, "Post-War Government and Politics of Korea," in The Jomnal ofPolitics, vol.9,no.4 
(November, 1947) pp.605-609. 
13Divid J. Da11:in, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948) p. 284 
14George McCune, pp. 616-619 
9 
Republic of Korea with S}1lgi1Wl Rhee as the first President. 1-' The National Assembly 
convened for the first time on May 31, 1948. On August 15, the new Republic of Korea 
was fonnatly inaugurated in Seoul. 
Ten days later, in response to developments in southern Korea the communist 
groups in North Korea established the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" as noted 
above and continued its preparations to make all Korea a Soviet satellite. On December 
31, 1948, the Soviet Union announced the evacuation of its troops from North Korea. On 
January 19, 1949, the Republic of Korea applied for membership in the United Nations. 
On June 29, 1949, the United States occupation forces withdrew from South Korea, 
leaving only five hundred members of the American military advisory group.I6 
In short, during the early postwar military occupation period, the liberated Korean 
nation was artificially divided by the two superpowers. Though they differed in planning 
and strategy, each intended to create a political sphere of influence. With the exception of 
China, the Allied powers persistently refused to consult with the Korean leaders on the 
destiny of Korea. Thus, viewed from the Korean side, the division of the country was a 
product of international politics. Korean political attitudes formed armmd the United 
States and Soviet Policies toward Korea. As the international situation changed, the South 
and North changed their policies and programs. 
Of course, the Koreans can not be considered totally blameless for the division of 
their country. The bitter ideological confrontation between the right wing and the left wing 
of the politied spectrum. and the blind loyalty of the Korean Communists to the Soviet . 
Union were important factors contributing to the division of Korea. It is, however, 
undeniable that Korea became one of the first sacrifices of the Cold War between the East 
and the West and a victim of their policies. No domestic force in a small nation like Korea 
l'Korea: Past and Present, p. 79 
161bid, pp. 79-80 
10 
could realistically resist or deter the imposition of international politics played by the world 
powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, it may well be said that the 
division of Korea was imposed by the power politics of the major powers and the 
dominating international environment at that time. The United States, Russia, China, and 
Japan therefore have some obligation to assist in the reunification of Korean peninsula. 
11 
lll. THE REALITY OF SOUTII-NORTII KOREAN RELATIONS 
A SOCIAL HETEROGENEITY 
When American and Soviet troops landed in the southern and northern regions of 
Korea across the 38th Parallel at the end of World War IT, most Koreans, regarded it as a 
temporary action and never thought it would become a barrier blocking the travel of people 
and the flow of goods between the two sides, much less cause the suspension of 
communications. 
However, the Soviet forces who entered northern Korea before the American 
troops landed in the South, 17 cut off the Kyongwon Railroad Une at the 38th Parallel on 
August 24, 1945, forcing South-bound trains to tum around at Chonkok, just north of the 
parallel. On August 25, they banned travel and the flow of goods across the parallel. 
Further, on September 6, the Soviets severed the trans-Korean telephone and telegraph 
lines in the Haeju area and suspended postal services between the two areas. 
At a preliminary meeting of the Joint US-USSR Committee, held in the Toksu 
Palace in Seoul on January 29, 1946, the U.S. military authorities proposed that the 
administrative aspects of North Korea and South Korea be integrated immediately, with the 
38th Parallel fimctioning only as a boundary between the U.S. and Soviet forces. 18 The 
U.S. military authorities further proposed that the operation of railroads and the electricity 
and communications of the two sides be integrated ; the two sides use a single cWTency 
system; and travel between the two sides be liberalized under specific procedures to be 
agreed upon by both sides. 
17Soviet forces landed in Kyonglnmg, Hamkyongbukdo, on August 8, 1945, and entered Pyongyang on 
August 22 after the Japanese surrendered on August 15. U.S. troops landed in Inchon on September 8, 
1945. 
1SU.S. State Department, Korea's Independence, Publication 2993, Far Eastern Series 18 (Washington D.C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 3-4. 
12 
The Soviet authorities responded passively, presenting a plan to allow barter trade 
between the two sides. The plan covered the exchange of specific commodities and 
facilities, and the limited integration of railroads and automobile traffic. However, even 
such limited exchanges could not be instituted due to the breakup of the Joint US-USSR 
Committee. 
Although the peninsula was divided, more than 3.5 million North Koreans escaped 
to the South before the Korean War, in spite of the fact that many were killed near the 
38th Parallel. Still, the mass migration indicated there were some loopholes along the "iron 
curtain." These loopholes allowed limited and unofficial exchanges of personnel and 
materials, called "38 trade" and "38 post." The Korean War, however, completely sealed 
even these loopholes. The war is eventual truce brought a total separation of the two 
societies. 
With the social breakup, the Koreas started to evolve in different directions. The 
South has grown into a free, open society based on the political order of h'beral democracy 
while the North has been transformed into a uniform Leninist society which has wholly 
rewritten or altered national history, based on the materialistic class view. From the time of 
its founding, South Korea faced the continuous threat of North Korea's desire to 
communize the entire peninsula by means of violent revolution or anned conquest. Thus, 
special emphasis on national security was an inevitable element in the fight for survival. 
On the other hand, security also served as the official reason or excuse for many 
restrictions. The South had to go through many trials and errors before it managed to root 
solidly the ideology of liberal democracy. Basically, however, the South has been an open 
society and since the late 1980s, when democratization solidly set sail, the South has 
enjoyed social stability and prosperity, though it has encountered some persisting pajns.l9 
19South Korean National Unification Board" A Comparison ofUnification Policies of South and North 
Korea" Seoul, Korea. (1990) pp 14-15 
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. In contrast, North Korea has been a closed, authoritarian regime. Under the 
superficial excuse of "constructing a Communist society", politics was geared to ensure 
Kim D-Swtg's absolute power and to facilitate a hereditary system of power succession. In 
this process, the North Korean authorities thoroughly depersonalized their people through 
extensive ideological control. The North tightened ideological integration and unity among 
the people by resettling, purging or interning, in "special dictatorial districts," those branded 
as ideologically "reactionary" or "unreliable." In time, the North adopted the concept of 
"juche" (self-reliance) in an attempt to beautify such integration. 
In this way, the North Korean people have been trained to "think the way the Great 
Leader thinks" and to regard this as a "glory even if they die in the course of fulfilling the 
instructions of the Great Leader." In late 1994, campaigns were launched to deify Kim 
Jong-D, son of the deceased leader, Kim D-Swtg. 
Thus, for part of the national society, national history was interrupted and 
traditional culture almost obliterated. This destroyed the national homogeneity of the 
Korean peninsula: South Korea tried to retain the nation's historical continuity by allowing 
the flower of liberal democracy to blossom fully on the basis of the proper inheritance and 
development of national culture. North Korea degraded the legacies of national culture to 
a superficial level and strove to replace its essential value with that of Communism. If this 
national heterogeneity is left unaltered, the two societies will become so different from each 
other that the people of the two sides will feel hardly any brotherhood when they happen to 
meet.20 
21lNational Unification Board "A Comparison ofUnification Policies of South and North Korea" Seoul, 








B. THE DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Before the division of the peninsuJa, northern Korea was economically greater than 
the rest of the country. Mining and heavy manufacturing industries were concentrated in 
this region. Northern Korea had most of the natural resources and industrial facilities while 
two thirds of the total population lived in the predominantly agricultural southern region. 
21 
Consequently, the South had a very weak economy from the time of h'beration until the 
early 1960s; so weak that it could not sustain even food self-sufficiency. Without the help 
of foreign grants, South Korea's economy could hardly have survived. 
Beginning in the 1960s, however, 1he South experienced an epochal economic 
development. Thanks to the successful implementation of the first five-year economic 
development plan, begun in 1962, the South registered a 7.8% growth rate per year during 
the period of the plan. The second plan period (1967-71) recorded a 9.6% expansion rate; 
the third plan period (1972-76) saw a 9.8% growth rate; the growth rate for the fowth 
plan period(1977-81) was 5.8%; and the expansion rate for the fifth plan period (1982-86) 
was 8.7%.22 A 7% growth rate was for the sixth plan period (1987-91). In addition, South 
Korea's growth rate reached 5.6% in 1993, and 8.5% in a haJf of 1994 (Jan.-June).23 
This remarkable growth and prosperity was not due to effective economic planning 
from the outset. As far as economic planning was concerned, the North initially far outdid 
the South, introducing economic plans as early as 1947. The problem originally was the 
efficiency of the North Korean economic system. In contrast, the government in South 
Korea, upholding the principle of industrial freedom, assisted key industries and other 
major sectors starting during the Park Chung-Hee years. In so doing, they expanded social 
ovemead capital to foster an environment advantageous to private industries. In addi1ion, 
21See Sonjin Hankook (Advanced Korea) (Seoup: Democratic Republic Party, 1978), pp. 454-455 
22See Comparison of the Economic Situations of South and North Korea (Seoul: National Unification 
Board, December 1989), p.28 
23Korea Trade Cooperation (KOTRA), (Nov. 15, 1994) 
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the South introduced foreign capital to smoothly raise necessary investment ftmds, while 
concentrating on the expansion of international cooperation and exports through the 
positive pursuit of an open policy. Due to the continuation of an export-oriented open 
economic system and the principle of industrial freedom, the South was able to build up its 
national strength so much that it was able to smpass the North in the 1960s and 70s and 
host the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988.24 
North Korea, on the other hand, pursued a socialist revolution and construction 
Wlder the guise of securing a material base for the "liberation of South Korea." Since they 
sought development only within the framework of the concept of a limited value, the North 
failed to take proper advantage of the economic superiority they enjoyed over the South at 
the time of division. 
The poor perfonnance of the North Korean economy is attributable to the fact that 
in the North private ownership of production facilities has been banned in favor of social or 
cooperative ownership. On this basis, a planned economy has been instituted in which an 
production, distribution and consumption activities Wldertaken on orders from authorities. 
In North Korea, agrarian reforms were effected in March 1946 during the Soviet 
military rule, prior to the establishment of the Communist regime. In August of the same 
year, major industries such as important manufacturing plants, transportation, 
communications and banking facilities, began to be nationalized. Thus, a foWldation for 
public ownership of all assets was established. 
After the Korean War, from 1953 to 1958, agricultw"e was collectivized and private 
sectors of commerce and industcy were socialized. In 1958 private ownership of all 
production means was eliminated in favor of overall social ownership in all economic areas. 
The only private ownership in the production area allowed was that which farmers 
24Th.e Korean Times (May 26, 1990) 
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produced through the cultivation of 66 square meters of land armmd their houses and 
through other businesses they operated during their off-duty hours.2j This planned 
economy was relatively effective for post-war rehabilitation and early-stage 
indus1rialization. With the progress of industrialization, or the rooting of Kim D-Sung's 
monolithic system, the planned economy began to backfire, and its reverse fimction has 
since deepened. 
The reversal of economic superiority began in the late 1960s, when the South took 
a striking lead over the North. 26 In 1992, the South's GNP stood at $294.5 billion and the 
per-capita GNP at $6,749 whereas the North's were $21.1 billion and $943, respectively.17 
The economic gap between the two sides of Korea arises :from the disparity in the bases of 
their respective economic policies. The bases of their policies, in tum, stem :from 
differences in their economic systems. In other words, the reason for the growing 
economic gap may well lie in the fact that whereas the South has allowed its economy to 
fonow the principle of economic development, North Korea has subjugated its economy to 
such political goals as the unreasonable communization of their society, schemes to 
communize the South, and Kim D-Sung's idolization. 
Inter Korean Trade (S. Korean Imports/Exports toN. Korea) 
( $ :Million ) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Import 1 22.0 20.0 165.0 200.0 
Export 0 0.6 4.7 26.0 12.8 
*Source: The Bank of Korea (Nov. 1, 1994)28 
2jSee Article 22 of the Constitution ofNorth Korea. 





17General Evaluation ofNorth Korean Economy (Seoul: National Unification Board, August 17,1994), p. 36 
28Jhe Korean Times (Nov. 8, 1994) 
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As shown above, there is a tremendous difference in the ammmt of goods that the 
South imports from North Korea and the ammmt of goods that the North allows the South 
to export into the North. Also, this means the South Korea has already become one of 
North Korea's major trading partners. ff the two sides are to increase trade, it will be 
inevitable for both sides to adopt a barter system in the initial stage. This system will be 
developed later into a co-production system in which a division of labor based on 
comparative advantages will be encouraged. 
C. 1HE ENVIRONMENT OF 1HE KOREAN PENINSULA UNIFICATION 
1. Four Powers' View and Role 
Due to its geopolitical conditions, the Korean peninsula has throughout the post-
war period remained the target of concerns by world powers stUTowtding the region. The 
Korean question has now become the major concern of the four powers surrmmding the 
Korean peninsula. The position and role of these four powers are sure to exercise 
significant influences on the future of the peninsula. In this respect, the following analysis 
endeavors to answer to two major questions: 1) what profits these powers have sought 
from the Korean peninsula? and 2) what change Korean unification, if realized, may bring 
about in their national interests? 
11. United Stlltes 
It can be said that the United States since it approached the Korean 
peninsula in the 19th century has pursued two major interests: militaiy interests and . 
economic interests. Up wttil its inteivention in World War IT, the United States had stuck 
to isolationism in foreign policy, and therefore it had refrained from interfering in Korean 
affairs. 29 However, after World War ll it emerged as one of the parties directly involved in 
29John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 9th edition (New Yorlc: CBS College 
Publishing, 1983), p. 70. 
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the Korean problem. The United States played the major role in detening Soviet influence 
from expanding southward. To this end the United States employed a containment 
strategy represented by its forward deployment of troops. The United States also played 
the role of preventing conflicts from taking place on the Korean peninsula, thus eliminating 
the possibility for any of the swrounding powers to intervene in Korean affairs. 
30 
The United States appears to be absolutely favoring Korean unification 
from its belief that unification will be achieved in a way Washington wishes: a unified 
Korea will contn'bute not only to the stability of the region but also to the promotion of 
U.S. economic interests. On the part of the United States, the process of unification can be 
regarded as more important than the unification itself.31 The United States has played the 
role of a power-balancer in the region. This role is still regarded as important in the future 
because the Korean peninsula will be \Ulder constant threat from the possible emergence of 
a hegemonic power. 
b. Russill 
HistoricaJly Russia has indulged in geopolitical and economic concerns 
regarding the Korean peninsula. Despite the tennination of the Cold War, Russia
's 
geopolitical interests still remains the same. Now Russia appears to admit the possib
ility of 
capitalist South Korea's absorption of North Korea, 
32 but it does not want to see the 
Korean peninsula emerge as a state threatening its security. In this respect, Russia has 
expressed its intention to fonn a multi-national security consultation body for the regi
on. 
In principle, Russia maintains an opposition to the presence of U.S. forces on the Korea
n 
peninsula; however, it does not want to see ei1her Japan or China replacing the role of U.S .. 
3~hael Chinworth and Dean Cheng, "The United States and Asia m the Post Cold War world. II SAIS 
Review, Vol. II, No. 1, 1991, pp. 88-91. 
llpark, Kyong Su, "Korean Unification and U.S. policy," Diplomacy, Vol. 20 (Dec. 1991), pp. 44-47. 
32Herbert J. Ellison, Recent Trends m Soviet East Asian Policy : The Soviet Crisis and Foreign Policy 
Toward East Asia. Vol. 6 (The National Bureau of Asian and Soviet Research. 1990), p.27 
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troops there. For this reason, Russia may prefer to see the United States improve between 
the relationship Pyongyang and Tokyo.33 
Russia also harbors an affirmative view regarding Korean unification. 
Moscow in the Post-Cold war period believes Korean unification vvil1 be achieved in the 
from of the capitalist South's absorption of the North. One specific concern of Moscow 
vvil1 be that cUlTelltly it is not in a position to directly intetvene in the unification process 
because it is bound by domestic affairs. In this respect, Moscow may prefer to see 
unification delayed until it recovers its strength so that it vvil1 be able to play an influential 
role in the process of the unification. For Russia, the Korean peninsula has always been an 
important geopolitical point located on the road to its southward advancement. So far as 
the Korean peninsula remains stable without creating any threat against Moscow's security 
posture, it has no reason to raise any objection to Korean unification. Moscow still 
maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang based on their military alliance treaty 
concluded in 1961. In pragmatic tenns, however, Moscow has already tilted toward Seoul. 
In this respect, Moscow cannot be regarded as harboring any objection to Korean 
unification. Most probably, Moscow may prefer to see unification achieved in the form of 
the South's absorption of the North. 34 
c. CIUlla 
China is not in a position to object to Korean unification, though it still 
appears to be concerned about political questions regarding its traditional ties with North 
Korea. Beijing is now concerned more about economic problems than political problems. 
So long as the Korean peninsula is not the target of hegemonism by other foreign powers, 
Beijing vvil1 be willing to sanction unification. On the other hand, China vvil1 be reluctant 
33Kim Yu Nam, "The Korean Unification and USSR's Policy", Diplomacy, No. 20 (1991), pp. 48-56. 
34Suck-Kyo Ahn. "Prospects for Economic Intergration of Socialist Economies in Northeast Asia," The 
Asian-Pacific Commwlity in the Year 2000: Challenges and Prospects, Monograph Series 91-01, No.6 
(Seoul: The Sejong lnst:i.tute, 1991), p. 224. 
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to see any of the following conditions taking place on the Korean peninsula - 1) any 
condition threatening China's vested rights over the peninsula, 2) any factor hindering 
China's political system or 3) any expansion of third cmmtries' influence. 
Regarding Korean unification, Beijing may harbor both a.ffinnative and 
negative views. From a political position, Beijing has to take into account two negative 
factors- its longstanding support for "two states and two systems" in its fonnula for the 
unification with Taiwan, and its traditional ties with Pyongyang which is desperately 
sticking to socialism. But in economic terms, the emergence of a unified Korea can be 
expected to contribute to the promotion of Beijing's interests. Moreover, China is expected 
to seek a mutual assistance structure with the unified Korea that can act as an apparatus to 
deter Japan from pursuing an expansionistic policy. But the above-mentioned negative 
factors seem to be losing their importance due to Beijing's pragmatic policy which can be 
characterized by its economic reforms. The change in Beijing's policy in part surfaced 
when it withheld its veto right over the question of the simultaneous entry of South and 
North Korea into the U.N.3~ 
d. Japan 
The Japanese position can be cited as different from the other SWTounding 
powers in that anti-Japanese sentiments still remain deeply rooted in the minds of the 
Korean people. Japanese wonies are that a unified Korea may emerge as a state taking the 
most vjgilant attitude against Japan. From Japan's perspective, it may be safer if the 
Korean peninsula continues to remain divided so that Japan will be able to apply the 
"divide and rule" policy, as Great Britain did in the past on the European continent · 
Japan's commencement of nonnalization talks with North Korea can be interpreted as 
being motivated by its intention to begin an equi-distant diplomacy toward the two Koreas. 
3~National Unification Board (Republic of Korea) "Information Service on the Unification Question of the 
Korean Peninsula" (Apr. 30, 1993), pp47-49. 
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Now in the post-Cold War era, Japan appears to be endeavoring to take over a leading role 
in 1he region especially SWTOWlding 1he Korean peninsula. Japan has shown a sensitive 
attitude toward the changes in the Korean situation which were represented by the rapid 
progress of South Korea's nordpolitik, the simultaneous entry into the U.N. by Seoul and 
Pyongyang and especially by Seoul's entering into diplomatic relations with Moscow and 
B ... 36 eumg. 
The Japanese policy toward the Korean peninsula has been represented by 
dualism: in official terms, it has stuck to 1he mutual cooperation system among Tokyo, 
Washington and Seoul, but on the other hand it has endeavored to maintain contacts with 
Pyongyang through non-governmental channels, while using its links wi1h Seoul. 
As was pointed out above, the four surrmmding powers, with the exception 
of Japan, now appear to be favoring Korean unification. Japan, despite its difference of 
position, however, will be also compelled to adapt itself to the changes in the circumstances 
sWTowtding 1he peninsula. It can be said that now the future of the Korean peninsula is 
heavily dependent upon the efforts by the directly concerned parties, South and North 
Korea themselves. 
2. South Korea 
Since 1he relations between Sou1h and North Korea made little progress after Kim 
D-Sung's death (July 8, 1994) and, accordingly, 1he expectations for unification escalated, 
some in South Korea argue that the South should achieve rapid unification by pursuing 
hardline policies towards North Korea. In summary, 1he policies are first, South Korea 
should exploit the present Wlfavorable situation of North Korea, both domestic and 
36Yoo Seung Ik, "Four Surrounding Powers' View and Role Regarding Korean Unification," Infonnation 
Service on the Unification Question of the Korean Peninsula, East Asian Review, (Vol V, No. I Spring 
1993), p.57 
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foreign. Second, South-north economic cooperation helps the North not only to maintain, 
but also to strengthen, its present regime. 
However, for the reasons discussed below, South Korea must pursue a 
continuation and extension of the present strategy, which seeks changes in North Korea's 
policy, while continuing to maintain an effective deterrent based partly on the alliance with 
the United States and the presence of U.S. forces. 
First, if the peninsula is unified under current conditions, that is, under conditions 
of continued political, economic, social, and cultural differences, it is expected that South 
Korea will be faced with unmanageable post unification problems, which, in twn, could 
lead to political, economic, and social instability. 37 On the other hand, if the Korean 
peninsula is unified by first implementing and realizing the Basic Agreement, then moving 
toward South-North reconciliation, followed by the opening of an era of cooperation, 
peaceful coexistence, and common prosperity, and finally working toward full unification 
gradually and peacefully through cooperation, both sides can, given sufficient time for 
preparation, overcome in advance many problems which might otherwise appear after 
unification. 
Second, given the rigidity of the North Korean regime as the isolation of North 
Korea deepens and its economic difficulties are aggravated ; as a result of South Korea's 
hardline policy towards the North, there is a remote posstbility that the North might initiate 
an all-out war. 
Third, while the unification of the Korean Peninsula should be achieved through -
dialogue and negotiation between the authorities of South and North Korea, a unified 
Korea will probably necessitate a new international relationship in Northeast Asia, requiring 
37Young-Kyu Park, "Korean Remlification: Implication for Northeast Asia" by the Pacific Fonnnl CSIS, 
Honolulu. Hawaii. (Jm1e, 1992), pp.89-93 
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the cooperation of: and support from, the neighboring powers, which cannot be obtained in 
the short-nm. 
3. North Korea 
Unfortunately, North Korea still refuses to abandon its long-standing strategy of 
unification by force and continues to ignore the Republic of Korea's efforts to promote 
inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. However, through the successful pursuit of 
its northward policy, based on the spirit of the July 7 Declaration, together with the various 
practical steps it has taken to promote a national community, the South has steadily built 
the foundations for inter-Korean peace and unification.38 
In analyzing the basic strategy of North Korea on the inter-Korean talks, it is 
evident that since the July 4th South - North Joint Communique of 1972, North Korea has 
capitalized on the inter - Korean dialogue as a tool for their united front strategy to 
"liberate" South Korea The North has insisted on the -withdrawal of U.S. troops in South 
Korea, and has agitated extremists and radicals to "\<iolent revolution. The changes in South 
Korea, which threatened social stability and shook the fabric of existing political, social and 
labor relations, have been "\<iewed by North Korea as an opportunity to accomplish its 
united front strategy. North Korean reunification strategies changed from massive war to 
peaceful coexistence, to peaceful offense, followed by People's Revolution. 
The reason that the North adheres to its nuclear weapons program despite the 
difficulties it faces (power transfer, economic plight and international isolation) is that any 
country possessing nuclear weapons automatically becomes a major militaty power. 
Fortunately, the United States and North Korea have reached a broad agreement on 
free2lng North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for a series of concessions from the 
38National Unification Board, "To Build a National Comrmmitythrough the Korean Commonwealth", 
Seoul, Korea (September 1989), p. 34 
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United States (on October 18, 1994). South Korea welcomed the agreement reached in 
Geneva. "We assess that the agreement has established an important base for a 
fimdamental solution of the nuclear problem and the preservation of stability and peace on 
the Korean Peninsula," South Korea's Foreign :Minister told reporters in Seoul.39 If it 
partly overcomes its international isolation through such effort, the North will can it a 
remarkable diplomatic achievement by the new leader Kim Jong-D, and will try to utilize it 
for reinforcing its internal integration. After that, having saved the face of its political 
system, the North is expected to open partiaJly its society in the pursuit of economic gains, 
which may or may not be used for opening its society wider, but could be invested instead 
in war preparations. 
In conclusion, North Korea has not acknowledged any change in its basic objective 
of unification by force if necessary. Would the North really prefer a peaceful 
confederation to a conquest by force? It maintains tactical flexibility to solve its three big 
difficulties by utilizing its nuclear weapons program and the nuclear card. Therefore, we 
should note carefully the relations between the United States and North Korea in the 
:futw'e. 
3'New Yolk Tunes (October 18, 1994) 
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IV. THE CURRENT UNIFICATION FORMULAS 
A SOUTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION FORMULA "KOREAN NATIONAL 
CO:MMJJNITY UNIFICATION FORMULA (KNCUF)" 
1. History of "KNCUF" 
The essence of the Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Reunification, which the 
South annmmced on August 15, 1970, was that the two sides, rather than committing 
hostile acts against each other, should engage in a good-intentioned compe1ition toward 
development, cons1ruction and creation in order to detennine which system was better. 
This compe1ition pre-supposed the co-existence of the South and the North. The July 4 
Joint Communique (1972), a highly significant historical document because it was the first 
agreement ever reached between the two sides, recognized each other's entities and 
maintained mutual co-existence. Based on this spirit of peaceful co-existence, the South 
annmmced the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification. Often referred to as the 
Jwte 23 Declaration (of Jwte 23, 1973), which featured: 1) tolerance of North Korea's 
entry into international organizations, 2) simultaneous entry into the United Nations 
pending unification, and 3) opening the door of the South to all other cowttries including 
Communist bloc nations regardless of ideologies or political systems. 40 
On January 18, 1974, the South proposed the conclusion of a South-North non-
argression agreement. On August 15 of the same year, South Korea annowtced the lbree 
Principles for Peaceful Unification incorporating the systematized overtures, declarations 
and agreements made in the past. The three principles were that: 1) a mutual non-
aggression agreement should be concluded between the South and the North to estabHsh _ 
peace on the Korean peninsula, 2) the two sides should open their doors to each other and 
restore their mutual trust, and to this end, South-North dialogues should be canied out 
4<1Kim, Yowtg Jeh, "'The Future Alternatives of South Korea's Unification Policy," Korea and W mid Affairs 
6, Seoul Korea, (Spring 1982) .• p.28. 
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faithfutly, and multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation should be promoted, and 3) based 
on these, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election 
management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, to 
accomplish unification. 
The announcement of the three principles was based on the perception and 
judgment that since prompt unification is impossible, given the reality of inter-Korean 
relations and the nature of international politics, the groundwork for peaceful unification, 
or dmable peace on the Korean peninsula and the reconciliation of the Korean people, 
should be laid first, and on this basis, political integration should be promoted. North 
Korea denounced the three principles as a "scheme to forge two Koreas. "41 However, since 
the existence of two political entities on the Korean peninsula is a starlc reality, its 
recognition cannot constitute any new act of forging. 
In the early 1980s, South Korea proposed mutual visits between the top leaders of 
the two sides on January 12, 1980, and a smnmit meeting on June 5, 1980. North Korea 
rejected a joint meeting between political parties and social organizations. Here, the South 
was obliged to make public, unilaterally, a unification formula which it had prepared for 
discussion at a top leaders' meeting. 
The idea of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, 
announced in a Presidential address on state affairs on January 22, 1982, featured the 
formation of a Consultative Council for National Reunification, with representatives from 
the two sides participating under the principles of: 1) national self-detennina1ion, 2) 
democracy, and 3) peace, in order to draft a unified constitution, thus making possible the 
accomplishment of unification through general elections held in both sides under the terms 
41 Koo, Yemmg-Nok and others, "Han Kuk eui Ton ll Jung Chaek"(Korea's Unification Policy), Seoul Korea 
: Nanam Publishing House, (1993).p.97 
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of the constitution. 42 North Korea's response was negative. Since unification concerns two 
separate entities, a unification idea of any type can be rendered meaningless if North 
Korea, one of the parties directly involved, rejects it. 
However, as can be seen in the case with East Germany and West Germany, calls 
for unification are bound to end up as nothing but lip service if there does not exist a party 
which takes the initiative.43 The July 7 Special Declaration, stated that the South would 
regard North Korea not as the target of competition or confrontation, but as a member of 
the nation and, further, as a "good-intentioned partner" with whom a national common 
prosperity, based on mutual trust, reconciliation and cooperation, should be pursued. 
The July 7 Special Declaration was supported extensively in South Korea and 
abroad, and contributed much to the successful staging of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. It 
also gave a boost to the successful implementation of the South's northern policy. The 
South Korean government aligned the National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification 
in line with the July 7 Special Declaration and armoWlced the Korean National Community 
Unification Formula on September 11, 1989. President Kim Young-Sam also re-
emphasized the Korean National Community Unification Formula on August 15, 1994, 
when Korea was confronting tensions over the nuclear question. 44 
2. Contents of the "Korean National Community Unification Fonnula" 
The Korean National Community Unification Formula, announced in a "special 
address" by former President Roh on September 11, 1989, details : a) principles for 
unification ; b) process for unification; c) organization and roles of an interim unification 
421bid., p. 48. 
43Seo, Byong-Chul, "Gong Sam Kwan Bung Kae wa Dok D eui Tong D" (Commmrist Block Collapse and 
Getman Unification) Seoul, Korea, Kyechook Publishing House, (Oct 1991), p. 68. 
44The Korea Times, (August 15, 1994) 
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team; d) procedures for the establishment of a unified state; and e) the future image of a 
unified Korea. 
11. Tltree Principles for Ullijieation 
The Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth 1hree 
principles for unification: independence, peace, and democracy. The president enumerated 
these principles by stating, "Unification must be achieved independently in keeping with a 
spirit of national self-detennination and under the principles of peace, non-use of military 
force, and grand national unity through democratic procedures. "4~ 
b. Process of Unification 
The Korean National Community Unification Formula provides that the 
two sides proceed toward the state of the Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage 
pending unification. 
The address laid down the process of unification as : a) a South-North 
swnmit meeting, 2) adoption of a national community, 3) formation of a Korean 
Commonwealth, 4) formation of a common sphere of national life and restoration of 
national homogeneity, 5) formation of social, cultural and economic communities on the 
basis of mutual recognition, non-aggression and co-existence and prosperity, and 6) 
realization of political integration. 
c. Organit.ation ojiiiJ interim Unification System 
South Korea, which suggested the creation and operation of a Korean 
Commonwealth as an interim stage pending the realization of a unified Korea, proposed 
the establisbment and operation of : a Council of presidents ; a Council of Ministers; a -
4.5special Address Made by President Rob, Tae Woo at the I 47th Regular National Assembly, Korean 
National Community Unification Fonnula: Basic Explanatory Materials (Seoul: National Unification Board, 
1989),p.48 
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CoWlcil of Representatives; and a Joint Secretariat as the organizations of the interim 
system. South Korea also proposed the creation and operation of a "peace zone. "46 
A CoWlcil of Presidents, or the chief executives from the two would 
function as the highest decision-making organ of the proposed Korean Commonwealth. A 
CoWlcil of Ministers, to be co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of the South and the North 
and to be comprised of about ten cabinet-level officials from each side, would discuss and 
adjust all pending South-North issues and ensure the implementation of its decisions. 
Under the CoWlcil, five standing committees would be created to deal with humanitarian, 
political, diplomatic, economic, military, and social I cultural affairs. 
The standing committees are to cany out programs related to : the reunion 
of dispersed families; easing of political confrontation; prevention of costly and 
COWlteiproductive inter-Korean rivahy on the world scene and the promotion of the 
interests of overseas Koreans; opening of the South and North Korean societies and 
promotion of inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation; development of national 
culture; fonnation of a common economic sphere for co-prosperity; promotion of 
confidence-building in the military area and anns control; and replacement of the Annistice 
Agreement system with a peace system. 47 
The South proposed the establishment of a unified state by: drafting a 
unified constitution; finalizing the draft constitution; holding general elections; and forming 
a unified legislature and a unified govenunent On the other hand, the Korean National 
Community Unification Formula sets forth a blueprint for a unified Korea relating to : the 
formation of the state; the formation of a legislature; and the features of a national society. 
461bid, p. 54. 
47Ibid., p. 68. 
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3. Features of "Korean National Community Unification Fonnula" 
In light of the global trends toward universal freedom, welfare and openness, the 
development of South-North relations should be focused on promoting the well-being of 
the entire Korean people. The Republic of Korea sincerely hopes that North Korea will 
pursue reform and openness under conditions of stability. The South has no desire to unify 
the Korean Peninsula by absorbing the North.48 
South Korea's inunediate aims of the policy toward the North are as follows: 
- Persuade North Korea to abandon its ambi1ions to communize the South. 
- Make improvements in the human rights situation in the North and resolve the 
issues of 1) the numerous families separated by the panitioning of the land 2) South 
Koreans who rated better by the division of the country and 3) freeing South Koreans 
who have been abducted by the North and are being detained there. 
- Convince the North to faithfully comply with the Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (commonly 
caBed the South-North Basic Agreement) and the South-North Joint Declaration of the 
De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This should include, among other things, the 
cessation of mutual slandering that is detrimental to reconciliation, and steps to build 
military trust with the goal of ending military confrontation. 
- Open the South-North dialogue. 
- Convince the North to cease nuclear adventurism. If and when Pyongyang 
ensures the transparency of its nuclear activities, the ROK is prepared to support the 
North's development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light-water reactor 
construction, by helping to make the necessacy capital and technology available. 
48Ibid, p. 16 
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-Get the North interested in the Korean National Community Unification Formula 
and work together with them to design and cany out projects aimed at helping to build a 
single national community. The contemplated support for light-water reactor construction 
could be the first such project. 49 
The ROK will make the necessary preparations for evecy possible mode of 
Wli:fication at any time. It is prepared to share the pain and sacrifice that could be 
accompany unification. The South will explore ways to cooperate with the North to ease 
the economic hard ship of the North Koreans, who are members of the same etlmic family 
as South Koreans. Toward that end and to promote the unification process, it is essential 
to first develop South Korea into a model democratic community. 
4. Basic Aims 
Unification no longer remains in the realm of a pipe dream or wishful thinking. It 
has now become a realistic goal, a feasible task. This calls for greater preparedness on the 
part of the South for unification, including the buildup of its capabilities to accomplish the 
task, as wen as its more active efforts to improve inter-Korean relations. 
The Getman and Yemeni experiences show that unification abruptly realized, 
without careful and systematic planning and preparations, can lead to enormously adverse 
consequences, even a new and real national catastrophe. Of course, the Administration has 
been pursuing a policy of progressive South-North integration, first to bring the two 
heterogeneous societies together into a single national community and further develop it so 
that a fully politicaBy unified Korea can be built eventually. However, it would be wise to 
rule out the possibility that unification can take place abruptly and unexpectedly against the 
49-fhe Korea Times. (Oct. 22, 1994) 
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wishes of the South. Accordingly, all possible scenarios must be examined and sufficient 
preparations made for any posstble twn of events. 
The most important way of preparing for unification is by translating the vision of a 
Wlified homeland into reality first in the South itself. so We must develop South Korean 
society into a model democratic community. This calls for a clear understanding on the 
part of each and evecy citizen of what his or her duties, as wen as rights, are. The public 
should also be fuRy prepared to share the pain and cost of attaining the glorious goal of 
Wlification. President Kim's Liberation Day speech was based on an acute awareness of all 
those implications and ramifications of the unification process. It was intended to prompt 
both the Government and the general public to think ahead and brace themselves for this 
momentous national task. .n 
North Korea is now in a state of flux foBowing the death of Kim D-Sung, its only 
leader for the past half centwy. Consequently, it appears that South-North relations will 
enter a new phase. This offers the Republic an unprecedented opportunity to actively 
transform inter-Korean relations. Considering the current situations of South Korea-Russia 
and South Korea-china diplomatic relations, and the North Korea-United States nuclear 
issue agreement, South Korean unification policy should be changed in order to accept a 
more resolute and more active North Korean Wlification policy. 
In summation, South Korea's basic aims are (1) to twn changes into opportunities, 
(2) to deal with the new North Korean Regime, (3) to urge shifts in the North's policy 
toward the South, (4) to outline joint projects for national development, and (5) to step 
up preparations for unification. 
SOJcorean National Unification Board, "A New Tack for Unity" (Aug. 15, 1994), p.25 
S1The Korean Tnnes (August 16, 1994) 
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B. NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION FORMULA "DEMOCRATIC 
CONFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF KORYO (DCRK)" 
1. History of the "DCRK" 
On August 14, 1960, the eve of the anniversary of National Liberation, while South 
Korea was in utter confusion following the Apri119 Student Uprising, North Korea first 
advanced the idea of unifying the Korean peninsula under a confederal system. In a 
speech, former Nm1h Korean president Kim D-sung, calling for unification through general 
elections, suggested the adoption of a confederal system as an interim step toward 
unification, adding that if a confederal system could not be instituted outright, then the two 
sides should first engage in economic exchange. 
Considering its timing, the overtw"e seemed to be strategically motivated. It had 
obviously been designed to steer the South's unification fever in a direction which would be 
favorable to the North. However North Korea's suggestion of a "confederal system" as an 
interim form of unification and of a "confederal office between the representatives of the 
South Korean and North Korean government," was seemingly reasonable and realistic. 52 
However, since North Korea demanded (1) the withdrawal of American forces from 
Korea and (2) the replacement of the South Korean government with a people's regime as 
prerequisites to inter-Korean negotiations for a confederal system, it was more than natw"al 
' for the South to reject the idea of a confederation. S3 
Beginning on June 23, 1973, the North made its unification policy consistent with 
its unification idea. On that day, which coincided with former South Korean President 
Parle's announcement of the June 23 Declaration in the South, former North Korean 
President Kim D-sung, in a speech at a public raBy welcoming the visiting Czechoslovak 
Party Secretary, General Husak, set forth the so-called "five - point unification program." 
52Yang, Ho-Min and others "Nam kwa Buk, Euo Tuke Hana ga Doena" (North and South Korea: The Road 
to Unification) Seoul, Korea: Nanam Publishing House, (1992), pp. 157-159 
S3Kim.Hak-joon, op. cit dissertation, p. 243. 
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The five points were: (1) prior settlement of militacy issues, 
(2) multi-pronged 
coDaboration and exchanges, (3) convocation of a grand nation
al conference, ( 4) 
unification under a Kmyo confederation system, and (5) joining the United Na
tions under 
a single ticket. 
The North thus began laying down prerequisites intended, in 
large measure, to 
eliminate South Korean government authorities. The
 confederation system the North 
proposed, now given the name, "Koryo", was not a confedera
tion between the government 
authorities of the South and the North, but a fonn of gov
ernment to be adopted at a "grand 
national conference", to be attended by the political parties an
d social organizations of the 
two sides. 
No concrete principles and other rules for the idea of a K
myo confederation system 
were produced at this stage. The prerequisites, also, were by n
o means concrete, and were 
designed primarily to eliminate the Seoul government authorities
 from talks on the Korean 
issue. However, in a speech at the Sixth Congress of the Worlce
rs' Party, in October 1980, 
North Korea produced a method for "establishing a Democ
ratic Confederal Republic of 
Kruyo," by setting forth more concrete principles for th
e creation of a confederal 
government and more complicated prerequisites. 
Contrary to its "South-North" 
confederation idea of the 1960s, a "Democratic Confede
ral Republic of Kruyo" has been 
advanced as the final fonn of unification. 
After that, the fonn and characteristics of the North's con
federation idea underwent 
some change in 1973, when the word "Koryo" was adde
d to its name, and again in 1980, 
when the words "democracy" and "Republic" were affixed t
o it. This confederation idea 
was incorporated into its unification policy when the Nor
th announced the "five-point 
peaceful unification program" in 1973. 
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l. Contents of tbe "OCRK" 
The idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea 
descn'bes as the "most perfect and reasonable fonn of unification," was contained in North 
Korea's policy report made at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party. The part of the 
speech pertaining to the idea of a confederation system consisted of three sections: (1) 
prerequisites to a confederation system, (2) principles for the formation and operation of a 
confederal government, and (3) ten major policies for a confederal government The 
following summarizes those three sections : 
11. P,erequisites 
First, to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland, the North provided 
the following prerequisites couched in traditional communist rhetoric : "militacy fascist rule 
should be liquidated and the democratization of the society realized in the South so that the 
present regime can be replaced with a democratic regime, voicing and defending the 
opinions and interests of the people." 
Second, fascist laws such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National 
Security Law should be repealed and all tyrannical offices abolished in the South. 
Third, all political parties and social organizations (including the Communist 
Party) should be legalized; freedom of political activities by political parties, social 
organizations and individuals (including Communist activities) guaranteed. 
Fowth, a dialogue should be realized and a peace agreement concluded 
between North Korea and the United States. The U.S. authorities should withdraw their 
troops from Korea at an early date. 
Fifth, the American scheme to forge two Koreas should be thwarted in 
order to realize the independent unification of the fatherland, and an end should be put to 
the United States' interference in the internal affairs of Korea. 
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Given these prerequisites, it becomes certain that the idea of a Democratic 
Confederal Republic of Koryo is a unification formula that can be put into practice only 
when the South Korean govenunent is replaced with a pro-Communist regime, caJled a 
"democratic regime," acceptable to the North. While thus denying the other side in 
dialogue, in favor of an imaginary regime, the North shows some tolerance when it comes 
to the issue of fonnation and operation of a confederal government. 
b. Priacipln for Forltlllli811 IIIUl OperllliD11 of Confederal Govemmmt 
First, the most realistic and reasonable method of unifYing the fatherland, 
on the principles of independence, peace and national unity, is for both sides of Korea to 
ally themselves and form a confederal state while retaining their ideologies and systems. 
Second, the North and the South should fonn a unified national 
govenunent on the basis of recognizing and tolerating the ideologies and systems existing in 
each other's areas as they are; a government where they shall participate as equals and 
where both the North and the South shall maintain their own regional autonomy, carrying 
equal rights and obligations. 
Third, the North and the South should form a Supreme National 
Confederal Assembly among the appropriate number of their respective representatives and 
overseas delegates, 1mder which they should create a confederal standing organization 
( confederal government office) to guide the regional governments of the two sides and to 
take charge of the overall programs of the confederal state. Fourth, the confederal state 
shall be caJled the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," named after the 
universally weB-known unified state of our country and reflecting the common political 
ideal of the South and the North, democracy.,.. 
S4The Research Institute for National Unification, The Korean Journal ofNational Unification. Seoul, Korea, 
Vol. 1 (1992)p.l34. 
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It can be easily perceived that these principles run COWlter to the 
prerequisites. Whereas the North demands the stepping down of the South Korean 
government in favor of a "democratic regime," as wen as a change in the South's political 
ideology, political system and laws, it suggests that the two sides form a confederal 
government as equals, retaining one's ideologies and systems and tolerating the other's as 
they are. The North disregards reality by arguing that the political form of the proposed 
confederal state should be a Democratic Republic, reflecting the common political ideology 
of the North and the South. This may be taken to mean that a confederal system could be 
adopted only when a regime pursuing the same ideology as the North's seizes power in the 
South. 
When North Korea discussed the principles for the formation of a 
confederal government in 1980, they did not produce any operational principles for the 
confederal system. They were laid down only in Kim D-SWlg's speech at a reception held 
to mark the 35th anniversaly of his regime, on September 9, 1983. North Korea's idea 
was that the two sides put up co-speakers and co-chairmen of a Supreme National 
Confederal Assembly and a Confederal Standing Committee, who would then operate their 
organizations by twn. 33 
c. Ten Mlfior Policies for 11 Confederlll SIJite 
(1) Enforcement of independent policies in all areas of state activities. 
(2) Implementation of democracy and promotion of national unity in all areas, throughout 
society and in all sectors. 
(3) Implementation of economic conaboration and exchanges, and guarantee of the self-
reliant development of national economy. 
55 Ibid pp. 76-77. 
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( 4) Realization of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of science, culture and education, 
and promotion of the uniform development of science-technology, national culture and 
national education. 
(5) Connection of transportation and communications of the North and the South, and the 
guarantee of free use of transportation and communica1ions across the country. 
( 6) Promotion of the stability of the Jives of workers, fanners, other worldng masses and 
the rest of society, and elevation of the people's wen-being. 
(7) Elimination of the state of military confrontation between the North and the South, and 
organization of allied national forces. 
(8) Support and protection of the national rights and interests of overseas Korean residents. 
(9) Proper handling of the external relations which the North and the South established 
before unification and uniform adjustment of the external activities of the two regional 
governments. 
(10) Development of friendly relations 'With all other countries as a unified state, and 
implementation of peace-loving external policies. -'6 
This 1 0-point policy is a kind which can be translated into action not only 
after the implementation of a confederal system, but even before its enforcement. These 
points, can also be canied out, regardless of a confederal system, for the sake of unification 
and Wtity of the nation. Nevertheless, North Korea continues to postpone any inter-
Korean exchanges and cooperation until after the realization of a confederal system. Its 
rejection, therefore, of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at this stage is hardly 
understandable. 
-'6Dr. Koo, Y eong-Nok and others, "Han Kuk Tong ll Jung Chaek"(K.orea's Unification Policy), Seoul, 
Korea : Nanam Publishing House (1993).p.189. 
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3. Features of the "OCRK" 
The idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea 
boasts as the most reasonable method of unification in this period, harbors several 
contradictory and problematic points in terms of requisites necessary for a unification 
formula. The confederation idea superficially calls for peaceful unification. In substance, 
however, it retains the basis of the North's unification policy, that is, "revolution in South 
Korea first and unification wtder communism later." The featw'es of the idea of 
"Democratic Confederal Republic ofKoryo".57 are: 
First, the idea of a confederation system, in its prerequisites, denies the system of 
the other side in dialogue. In other words, the idea of the "Democratic Confederal 
Republic ofKoryo" is not a unification formula designed to introduce a confederal system 
through dialogue and negotiations between the governments now existing in the South and 
the North. In as much as it asserts that a confederal system could be adopted only when a 
regime suitable to the idea is established in South Korea, the North's idea of a 
confederation system is a "unification idea without any object," at least at the moment. 
The number one prerequisite is that the incumbent Seoul regime should step down in favor 
of a "democratic regime" (people's democratic regime), which, in effect, means "revolution 
in South Korea." 
Second, despite the rejections, in its prerequisites, of the ideology and system of the 
other side, the confederation idea, in its principles for the formation and operation of a 
confederal organization, calls for the introduction of a confederal system on the basis of 
mutually tolerating different ideologies and systems, thus leaving room for mistaking the 
confederation idea for a unification formula based on peaceful inter-Korean coexistence. 
The contradictions between its "prerequisites" and its "principles for the formation and 
3
'National Unification Board, "A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea," Seoul, 
Korea (1990), p.92 
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operation of a confederal office" are obviously intentional and not the product of ignorance 
or mistakes. This can be seen in the fact that the emphasis is placed on "principles" instead 
of "prerequisites" when the North propagandizes its confederation idea. 
lbird, one of the "principles," that "the two sides mutually recognize and tolerate 
the difference in their ideologies and systems," does not refer to tolerance and coexistence 
between the hDeral democratic system of the South and the Communist system of the 
North. Instead, it implies co-existence based on the mutual recognition and tolerance of 
the difference between the ideology and system of the South after the "prerequisites" are 
fulfilled (namely, people's democracy of the South), and the socialism of the North. Thus, 
as far as this is concerned, it is a hoax, but no logical contradiction exists, at least on the 
surface, between the "prerequisites" and the "principles." 
Fourth, the North makes it clear that the 10-point policy is for implementation after 
unification is achieved under a confederation system. ff so, the 1 0-point policy cannot be a 
policy that has anything to do with the idea of unification. The North's policy to engage in 
exchanges and cooperation, and promote grand national unity only after unification, does 
not conform to the procedw'al order of unification and runs counter even to the principle 
of grand national unity, one of its own three principles for unification. The South and the 
North should engage in exchanges and cooperation and promote unity to achieve 
unification. However, this is not to say that both sides should promote unification in the 
interests of exchanges and cooperation. To those who view the 1 0-point policy wi1hout a 
perusal look at the procedural order of the institution of a confederal system, the policy 
may seem plausible. However, it should be pointed out that a pitfaD exists here, a pitfaD in 
which the procedural order of unification turns upside down. 
Fifth, the fact that there is a difference in the description of the word 
"confederation" in Korean and in foreign languages, represents another indication of the 
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dual-nature of the idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo." In Korean, 
"confederation" is expressly defined as "federation." In substance, also, it caDs for a kind of 
federation-style integration. Under such a system, a federal government exercises external 
sovereignty including military and diplomatic rights. In English and other foreign 
languages, however, the word "confederation" embodies the concept of the association of 
states and is used in a different way than "federation." This confusion in terminology is 
obviously intentional, since the North is aware that the idea of the "association of states," 
rather than the more appealing "federation" as an interim stage of unification, is discussed 
often in the international community. ~s 
In this way, the idea of "democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" harbors several 
problematic points: concealment of strategic goals, antagonism in prerequisites and 
principles, inversion of procedural order, one-sidedness of contention, and ambiguity of the 
expression of the basic concept. Still, North Korea argues that the confederation idea is 
the most reasonable plan true to the three major principles for unification: independence, 
peace and grand national unity. North Korea explains the prerequisites ( aimed at 
engineering a "revolution in South Korea") in the context of "independent unification"; the 
principle of fonning a confederation through coDaboration between a "people's democratic 
regime" of the South and the North Korean regime, in the context of "peaceful 
unification"; and the 10-point policy, in the context of "grand national unity", 
respectively. ~9 
5~ational Unification Board," A Comparison ofUnification Policies of South and North Korea," Seoul, 
Korea (1990), p. 165 
59JGm, Kyong-tae, op. cit dissertation, p. 104. 
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4. Stratagem in the "DCRK" 
North Korea's Glossary on Political T enninology says "the system of federation is 
one of the forms of association between or among nations with different languages, 
customs and cultures." It adds that if a "federal system" were to be fonned, a "federal 
constitution should be established. "60 In reality, the countries which have adopted the 
federal system are multi-racial nations. Good examples are the fonner Soviet Union, the 
United States and Switzerland. Therefore, if South Korea and North Korea were to be 
unified, it does not need to be under a confederal system. The Koreans are not multi-
racial, nor do they have different languages, customs and cultures. However, since the 
political and economic systems of the two sides differ in reality, the need to have an interim 
stage in the course of fanning a unified state exists. In this event, it is necessary to do an 
in-depth study to determine which would be better, a confederation or an association of 
states. In April1945, the Chinese Communists had gone so far as to propose the creation 
of a "coalition government" In Vietnam, from September 1960 through the early 1970s, 
the North Vietnamese Communists abetted the split in South Vietnam through their 
persisting offer to the Saigon government for the establishment of a coalition government. 
Using this tactic, they finally succeeded in communizing South Viemam. East Germany, 
also, proposed to West Germany, on December 1956, the idea of the association of states 
as an interim step pending German unification. However, this was ou1rightly rejected by 
West Germany. 
In this manner, the Communists sought, successfully in some instances, to achieve 
their goal of communization through various fonns of the tactics of association, or 
federations. Employing these same Communist tactics, North Korea has ceaselessly been 
demanding a confederation system. There are signs that show that North Korea has 
60See "Confederation System" in Glossary ofPolitical Terminology (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing 
Co., 1973). 
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particularly used Chinese and North Vietnamese tactics as a model. For example, the 
North's so-called 10-point policy resembles, in substance, the "10-point nation-saving 
policy against Japan" which the Chinese Conununists advanced in their proposal for the 
second collaboration with the Kuomintang, or the "1 0-point national hberation policy" the 
Vietcong offered in their call for the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon. 
61 
What should also be pointed out is that since North Korea started to advocate the 
idea of a "Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo" as a Wlification formula, the 
overtures the North has made to the South were mostly aimed at getting the prerequisites 
realized. For example, the North proposed mostly rally-like meetings such as a "joint 
conference, " a "political conference" and a "pan-national conference" between political 
parties, social mganizations and people from all social backgrmmds, instead of talks 
between government authorities with due competence and responsibility. Similarly, rather 
than resuming the suspended existing dialogues such as the Red Cross, economic and 
sports meeting, the North advanced new meetings which were related to its call for the 
withdrawal of American forces from Korea, which included anns reduction talks, high-
level political and military meetings, a joint parliamentary conference and a tripartite 
meeting. 
Seen thus, the North's idea of 'Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" cannot 
be taken as anything but a device intended to establish a regime in the South which win be 
subservient to the North Korean regime. 
61 For an analysis of the background leading to the announcement of the July 7 Special Declaration, see Lee, 
Hong-koo, Policy Basis and Implementation Direction of Korean National Commtmity Unification 
Fonnula, Theoretical Basis and Policy Direction of Korean National Commtmity Unification Fonnula 
(Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990), pp. 11-14 
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C. COMPARISON OF UNIFICATION FORMULAS 
The main purpose of this section is to understand the differences and similarities in 
the unification policies of South and North Korea 80 as to project a possible C01JI"8e, or set 
of courses, for future Korean Unification. 
1. Similarities 
So far, unification policies were instituted by both sides for the political purpose of 
attaining long term power. In other words, there are rivals who are politically opposite with 
regard to the unification issues. Also they would both have to adhere to a change, and 
therefore, the unification policy gives both govemmenfs leaders a feeling of uneasiness. 
That is why there has been no substantial progress. 
Both the North and South Korean governments have set forth official formulas for 
national unification which they consider blueprints on how each side would proceed with 
the "peaceful" unification of the two separate states. Each side claims that its own formula 
is fair and workable 80 that the other side must accept. Indeed, both formulas have been 
used as excellent vehicles for extensive propaganda campaigns. 62 
A free North-South general election for complete union will be held eventually in a 
democratic way. Also, both formulas are designed for domestic consumption because the 
Korean populace living both in North and South consider the issue of national unification 
to be an important national task. 63 Namely, both the DCRK and the KNCUF proposals are 
s1ructural devices designed to play unification politics for domestic purposes, largely 
ignoring value integration. North Korea had taken a variety of initiatives for reunification 
which contained conditions more favorable to the North than to the South. Kim D-Sung 
62Prot: Kang Suk Rbee, "Unification Policy of the Two Koreas: Problems and Prospects" Korean National 
Defense College, (Aug, 1992), p. 36 
63por the text of the DCRK, See "Jae Euk Cha Dang Dae Hoe Jtmg Ang Ewi Bogo" 
(Report on the WOiks ofthe Cen1ral Committee to the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers Party), 
Pyongyang: Samhaksa. (1980), pp. 72-79. 
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caned for revolutionary strategy to tum North Korea into a powerful revolutionary
 base by 
fortifying its political, economic, and military capabilities. In the meantime, South K
orea's 
unification policy in the 1960s, which was canied out by Park Chung-Hee, conce
ntrated 
on the building of ·economic power at home and international support abroad
 while 
simultaneously ignoring aJl overtures from North Korea. In other words, South
 Korea 
rested its basic position toward North Korea on 1he "economic constructio
n first, 
unification later" slogan. 64 
In the 1970's, however, the situation changed. South Korea achieved remarkable
 
economic growth and its ability for its own defense has also grown, while 1he am
oWlt of 
U.S. assistance, both economic and military, has gone down considerably. Under
 such 
circumstances, South Korean decision-makers Wlderstandably tended to place great
er stress 
on seJf-help and self-reliance. The emergence of Japan also gave South Ko
rea an 
increasing margin of choice. Since 1he signing of 1he treaty to restore diplomatic r
elations, 
Japan has emerged as a major foreign power in tenns of its political and economic 
influence in South Korea. By 1he same token the U.S. monopoly of influence ove
r South 
Korea both in political and economic aspects has declined. 
Finally both North and South have constantly reiterated that the unification of the
 
divided coWltry is basically an internal problem of 1he Korean people. However, ch
anges 
in strategy have frequently been forced upon the both Korean leaderships by
 various 
external factors such as 1he multipolarity of international environment. In pursu
ing their 
objectives, North and South Koreans have continuaDy articulated positions which are 
diametrically opposed to each oilier. 
64Dr. Park, Gun-Yang, "Unification Polities of North and South Korea : Development and a
n alternative" 
The University ofTexas at Austin, (1990) p. 182 
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l. Contrasts 
There are several significant differences in the unification formulas set forth by 
South and North Korea. 65 First is a difference in the organization and policy of a unified 
state. The South Korean unification formula seeks to establish, by peaceful, democratic 
means, a completely unified democratic republic pW"Suing the ideals of nationalism, 
democracy, liberty and individual wen-being. In contrast, the North Korean formula seeks 
an incomplete unification wtder which two regional governments are to exist under the 
cloak of a confederation. Moreover, North Korea's ultimate goal is not even confederation 
but actuaBy the communization of the en1ire peninsula. As preconditions to discussing 
confederation, the North has insisted that the South replace its ann-Communist government 
with one sympathetic to Communism and that the American forces in Korea be withdrawn. 
Their obvious intent is to create the conditions conducive to a Communist takeover. 
Second are differences in the method of unification. The South Korean unification 
formula provides a set of democratic procedures leading to unification: (1) the drafting of a 
constitution of a unified cowttry by the Consultative Conference for National 
Reunification, (2) the making of the cons1itution into law through national referendwns, (3) 
the holding of general elections under the constitution, and ( 4) the forming of a unified 
legislatme and government through general elections. The North Korean formula, 
however, forecloses any democratic procedW"es. It excludes specific persons of the 
Republic of Korea from taking part in "confederal organizations" such as the Supreme 
National Confederal Conference and the Confederal Standing Committee; and attempts to 
force unilateral conditions upon the South. 
Third is the difference in the approach to unification. The unification fonnula of 
the Republic calls for the nonnaJization of inter-Korean rela1ions through the conclusion of 
6-'Korean Overseas Infonnation Service, "Unification Endeavors by the Republic of Korea" Seoul, Korea 
(May 1982) pp. 20-24. 
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a provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea as a measure 
conducive to unification. Based on this Agreement, steps would then be taken to restore 
national solidarity, remove factors detrimental to unification and prevent the recurrence of 
war, thereby fostering national hannony and an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful and 
democratic achievement of unification. In contrast, while North Korea's formula outlines 
some inter-Korean cooperation in what is called the "ten major policies," Pyongyang 
expressly states that there can be no cooperation Wltil after a confederation is formed, or in 
other words, Wltil the "communization of the whole of Korea has become a certainty." 
1bis is so Wlfeasonable and unrealistic that there is no chance of success. 
The fourth is the difference between the Consultative Conference for National 
Reunification (CCNR) and the Meeting to Expedite Unification or the Grand National 
Conference. The CCNR would be composed of participants from each side who would 
represent the views of the residents of their respective areas. Each side would select its 
representatives Wlder its own political order and would not interfere in the selection of the 
other side's representatives. The responsibility of the CCNR would be to draft a 
constitution of a united country. North Korea, on the other hand, has set limits on who 
could take part in the Grand National Conference which they recently renamed the 
Meeting to Expedite Unification. North Korea insists that the authorities of the incwnbent 
government of the Republic of Korea could not take part in the meeting along with a 
number of other South Koreans singled out by North Korea. Pyongyang has made the 
additional assertion that to "facilitate" the meeting, the Republic of Korea should change its 
judicial, political and social systems. Also, there are different definition of the words. 
"Peace" is certainly an important value toward which both sides could converge. However, 
"Peace" is perceived differently, and the means to achieve it is conceived differently by the 
leaders and the people of the North and the South. The fifth difference concerns 
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conflicting views on the U.S. forces presence in South Korea As they see it, the most 
serious stumbling block for the North Koreans to achieve peace on the peninsula is the 
43,000 U.S. forces stationed in the South. However, the American presence is perceived 
by the South Koreans as "the comer-stone of peace. "66 The leaders of the North strongly 
believe and the people are educated to think that an the hardships they are suffering are 
caused by the threat from the American forces and that they have to sacrifice their wen-
being in order to defend themselves. 
The sixlh major difference is the fact that since their division, South and North 
Korea have maintained different ideologies and systems. Nevertheless, both have invariably 
voiced the need for national unification. When it comes to policy goals and methodology, 
however, the two sides show a substantial disparity, leading to a state of acute 
confrontation. More specificaDy, North Korea's policy is "unification first"; that is, North 
Korea's main objective is to unify the Korean peninsula Wlder the rubric of "Juche" by 
ini1iaJly reaJmng the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in Korea, then stimulating a pro-North 
Korean attitude in the South and then taking the initiative to open a dialogue with South 
Korea on the unification issue. 67 On the other hand, the South has adopted a step-by-step 
approach toward unification in which both South and North Korea wiD seek co-existence 
and co-prosperity, and build mutual trust which will be a basis for integrating the two 
Koreas. 
In my opinion, this disparity in policy goals and methodology regarding unification 
may have deri\led from the fact that each side has maintained and developed its own 
ideology and system. More basicaDy, however, its source may wen be the deep-rooted 
mutual distrust caused largely by the Korean War. As a consequence, neither accepts the 
66Prot: K.ang Suk: Rhee, "Unification Policy of the Two Koreas : Problems and Prospects" Korean National 
Defense College, Seoul, Korea (1992), pp. 152-154. 
67Hideshi. Takesada, "Korean Security and Unification in the Detente Era," The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis, Vol Ii. No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 185-186. 
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process or fonn of Wlification proposed by the other.68 For instance, on the one hand, 
South Korea argues that North Korea's "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" 
unification formula superficially calls for peaceful unification and retains the basis of the 
North's unification policy, that is, "revolution in South Korea first and unification wtder 
communism later." On the other hand, North Korea criticizes South Korea's "Korean 
National Community Unification Formula" for perpetuating the division of the peninsula. 69 
This fimdamental difference in objectives as wen as strategies regar<ting the politics of 
unification, then, has resulted in the basic differences between the two Koreas. 
·The differences between the two sides became evident in the series of North-South 
meetings between September 1971 and Jwte 1973. North Koreans publicly emphasized 
their peaceful intent and agreed to engage in a high level dialogue with South Korea. 
Pyongyang, however, began a secret buildup of its military forces at about the same time. 
After the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue failed in 1973, the North shifted to an intensive 
diplomatic lobbying campaign against the United States and South Korea, which lasted 
unti11976. The North Koreans supplemented their diplomatic campaigns with "carrot and 
stick" tactics, which consisted of occasional peace overtures to the United States and 
periodic tension-building initiatives such as the axe-killings of American soldiers at 
Panmwtjom. North Korea also attempted massive infil1ration into South Korea. They sent 
large numbers of secret agents and gueniDa units into South Korea. This type of North 
Korean tactical infiltration continued while the North-South Korean_ talks were being 
held.70 
68park, Yong Kyu, "Aims Control and Unification", KIDA (The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses), 
(Oct. 1992), p. 16 
69
"Democratic Confederal Republic ofKoryo" and the "Korean National Community Unification Formula," 
National Unification Board, A Comparison ofUnification Policies of South and North Korea (Seoul: 
National Unification Board, 1990), p.45. 
70Dr. Kwak, Tae-Hwan, "Han Ban Do Pyong Wha Tong ll Eun Gu" (In Search of Peace and Unification on 




Nameofthe Korean National Community Fonnula for Creating 
formula Unification Fonnula Democratic Confederation 
ofKmyo 
Basic philosophy Based on the value of freedom Juche self-reliance ideology 
md democracy (a variation on Stalinism) 
Unification In 3 phases: reconciliation md Gradual completion of 
process cooperation-a Korean common- a confederation 
wealth-a unified single nation-
state 
Emphasis is on building a single Emphasis is on developing 
national community leading to the structure of a unified 
full Wlity state 
Interim Korean commonwealth None 
arrangement 
How to establish By democratic general elections Through negotiations 
a unified Korea in both the South and the North at a conference of 
under the constitution of a delegates from political 
unified Korea and civic groups 
Format of a uni- A unified single nationstate A confederation of two 
fted Korea with one system and one states, each with its own 
government system and government 
Vision of a uni- Advanced democratic country None 
fted Korea enswing freedom, welfare and 
hwnan dignity for all 
Prime mover be- Entire Korean people Proletariat 
hind unification 
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The Wlification strategies of both the North and South have changed several times. 
They were dependent upon each side's assessment of their own and their counterpart's 
strength, both internal and external, and of the international environment. Seoul's 
unification policies changed from Marching to the North during the First Republic, to 
neutralism during the Second Republic, to suppression of the unification movement in 
order to put the emphasis on economic development and rapprochement during the Third 
through Sixth Republics. 
North Korean policy toward the South has been highly opportunistic. 71 The DPRK 
government is ready at all times to exploit any internal turmoil in South Korea, partly to 
reaffirm its own reunification plan and partly to divert the attention of its people from 
domestic problems. When circumstances have changed and one tactical approach has 
fallen short, the North Koreans have not been reluctant to try another. Pyongyang pressed 
for immediate, sweeping political and militaiy measures- the fonnation of a North-South 
confederation, the abolition of the anti-Communist laws in the South, and radical anns 
reductions. They contended 1hat such dramatic changes were necessary to create a new 
climate of trust, after which fwther moves could be made toward inter-Korean 
cooperation. North Korea demands the withdrawal of the American forces as a 
prerequisite for any peaceful resolution of Korean conflict. It has viewed the continued 
presence of U.S. forces in South Korea as an obstacle to an inter-Korean detente and 
peaceful reunification of Korea. Thus, DPRK demands for U.S. 1roop withdrawals have 
been a consistent policy since the division of the Korean peninsula. For South Korea and 
its allies the major obstacles preventing peaceful reunification were not the United States 
forces but rather the North's goal of bringing South Korea under its control - that is, 
reunification on the Nortb's temts. 
71Lee, On-Jook, "Buk Han Sa Hwi Yomt Gu" (A Study on North Korean Society), Seoul, Korea: Seoul 
National University press, (1990), p. 122 
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In a sense South Korea's wrification poticy has been essen1ially in the nature of a 
response to North Korean unification poticy, since it was North Korea which has 
maintained more aggressive strategies toward South Korea and which has resorted to both 
military and potitical means to unify the cotm1ry tmder their hegemony. 
North Korea's long-range unification strategy is a simple one; to unify the cotmtry 
tmder Communism. 72 This poticy has remained tmchanged for the past half centwy and it 
is Hkely there will be no substantial change in the near future. The North Korean meaning 
of unification is clearly stated in the preamble to the revised charter of the Korean W orlcers' 
Party adopted in the Sixth Party Congress on October 13, 1980. It reads that "the ultimate 
task is to imbue the entire society with the Juche ideology while, at the same time, to 
estabtish a Communist society throughout the cotmtry." This statement clearly indicates 
that unification is exactly the same as the communization of the entire peninsula by means 
of revolution. 
In explaining the developments of both Koreas' poticies of reunification, I have 
paid attention to the change of leaderships. At the outset, it was premised that there is a 
relationship between change in leadership and change in unification poticy. 
'12Jhe Ministry ofNational Defense, The Republic ofKorea "Defense White Paper", (1993-1994), pp. 65-67. 
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V. LESSONS FROM TilE GERMAN UNIFICATION 
A. SIMILARITIES 
There are some important similarities in the Gennan and Korean situations. North 
Koreans, like East Gennans, enjoyed a period of independent economic success despite 
disadvantageous external conditions. At the same time, South Koreans, like
 West 
Gennans, appear bent upon assuming that their long-suffering compatriots mu
st be 
transfonned to adopt their rules, standards, etc., in short, South Korea's s
ystem. 
References to "deprogramming ... the North Korean people's brain washed mindset" is
 an 
extreme expression of the view that victims of communist rule have been so debased th
at 
they have nothing to bring to the unification process in the near term. 
73 This attitude is 
central to the psychological problems which have tarnished Gennan unification. Al
though 
this dimension is registered by Korean analysts of Gennan unification, it is consistent
ly 
Wtderplayed in favor of greater attention to economic costs. 74 
Korea and Gennany experienced a painful national separation for a half century 
since World War ll. Both nations' enthusiasm for their unification was very strong. 
From 
the confrontation during the Cold War period, West Gennany and South Korea could w
in 
over the other sides, East Gennany and North Korea, 
with efficient ideological economic and political systems. 
The economic dimensions of the fonner Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) vis-
a-vis ex-GDR(German Democratic Republic) and South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea seem 
to resemble each other on the surface. Roughly speaking, the size of the FRG econo
my in 
terms of GNP was about ten times greater than that of the GDR economy befo
re the 
unification. After the unification, the first reliable official economic data was rel
eased 
73Byung Chul Koh, "Inter-Korean .Agreements," Korea and World Affairs. Vol. XVI, No.3
 (Falll992), 
p. 465. 




recently. According to the Federal Governments Statistical Office, in the last haJf of 1990, 
that is, the first six months after the unification, the eastern Gennan GNP was estimated at 
105.3 billion Deutsch Mark (DM) or 60.2 billion dollars, while the western German GNP 
was approximately 1.28 trillion DM Thus, the East Gennan economic size represents only 
8.3% of West Gennany's." Similarly, it is reported that the South Korean GNP ($238 
billion) in 1990 is roughly nine to ten times bigger than that of North Korea ($23.1 
billion). 76 
In my opinion, it seems to be that North Korean leaders are wacy of absorption-
unification due to the consequences resulting from the German unification example as 
descn'bed above. 
B. CONTRASTS 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West Germany was a decentralized 
federal govmunent founded originally by Lacndcrs. The Federal Republic was created by 
local governments (Laender). What is more, the rise in popularity of federalism over 
centralism has been impressive. 77 By contrast, the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South 
Korea is a highly centralized typical unitaty government The ROK's central government is 
now wrestling with the timetable of when and how to form local administrative 
governments. Thus far, only the local and provincial legislative assemblies have been 
formed, and they have been in operation only since 1991. In short, West Germany has bad 
(and the current unified Germany has) a :finnly rooted local autonomy, while South Korea 
has just begun its political expe~iments with local autonomy. 78 
75Sung-jo Parle and Sung Chu1 Yang, Gennan Unification and Korean Division (In Korean) (Seou1: 
KytmgruUD University Press, 1991) 
76North and South Korean Social and Cultural Indicators (m Korean) (Seoul: Ministry ofUnificati.on Board, 
1991), p. 54. 
77David Marsh, The New Gennany at the Crossroads (London: Century, 1989), p. 79. 
78Byong-sak Koo, The Principles ofNew Constitution (In Korean) (Seoul, 1989), pp. 1000-1022 
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Above aJl, the FRG has been one of the most stable and efficient democratic 
nations in the post-War world. Thus far, it has experienced two inter-party transfe
rs of 
power from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) coalition to the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) coalition in 1969 and from the SPD coalition back to the CDU..CSU 
(Christian Social Union)-led coalition in 1982. During this period, the FRG had five 
presidents and thirteen cabinets of which eight were fonned by CDU-led coalition
s, and 
five, by SPD-led coalitions. 79 
By contrast, the ROK has been marked by political instability dwing the same 
period. It had six republics with nine constitutional revisions, not to mention two
 military 
coups (1961 and 1979), three major student and popular uprisings (1960, 1980 and 1986) 
and some twelve declarations of martial laws and emergency decrees. Since its 
fmmding, 
the ROK has experienced only two peaceful transfers of power in 1988 and in 1993. 
Even 
then, the power succession did not occur between parties, but within the ruling part
y. Thus, 
South Korea has yet to experience a peaceful transfer of power from the ruling part
y to an 
opposition party. All in all, South Korea is in the midst of an early phas
e of 
democrat:ization at best, or it is still being plagued by political instability and politic
al 
infantile paralysis. so 
Noteworthy also is the fact that West Getman government is a typical cabinet-t
ype 
system, while South Korea's c\llTent Kim regime is a presidential system. The
 West 
Gennan legislature is bicameral, B1mdestag and B1mdesrat, and that of South 
Korea is 
unicameral, the National Assembly. The powers and authority of Gennan L
aender are 
strong and growing, but the newly created South Korean local assemblies
 are inherently 
7'9l)avid Marsh, The New Gremany at the Crossroads (London: Century, 1989), pp. 64-88. 
80sung Chn1 Yang, "Th.e Implications ofGennan Unification for Korea: Legal, Political, and I
nternational 
Dimensions," Korea Joumal31 (Spring 1991): 41-50 and also his "Two 'Democracies' in Korea," Korea 
Journal (January 1990), pp. 4-16. 
weak. They are dependent upon, and subject to, the control of the central government. 81 
Worse still, South Korea uniJateraDy postponed the mayoral and the provincial 
gubematoria1 elections un1il1995. In doing so, he has, in fact, violated the local autonomy 
laws which, among other dUngs, prescn'bed such elections by JW1e 1992. In protest, 
opposition parties - the Democratic Party and the United People's Party - boycotted the 
nmmal operation of the 14th National Assembly. 
The FRG and the ROK's legal or constitutional provisions for unification, too, are 
in stark contrast. The FRG's Basic Law was "temporary" in nature as its Preamble 
stipulates, i.e., "desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period, has 
enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Gennany .... " Consequently, the Gennan people are yet to enact a new 
Constitution(Verfassung) for the Wlited Gennany. The irony is that the FRG's Basic Law 
has remained virtually intact, albeit two revisions during the last forty years, despite its 
"transitional" character. By contrast, the ROK's constitution, its seemingly "pennanent" 
nature notwithstanding, was revised nine times with six substantial changes. 
The FRG's Basic Law had two legal provisions enabling unification (Articles 23 
and 146), while the ROK's cmrent constitution has six provisions dealing with unification. 
Unlike the West Gennan basic Law, however, the South Korean constitution claU:ns the 
tenitocy covering both the present South Korea and North Korea (Article 3). Most 
importantly, the Gennan framers of the Basic Law, as wen as its key political leaders, 
placed the task on both the ruling and opposition parties and seldom resorted to using the 
Basic Law or its revision as an instnunent for perpetuating or strengthening their own 
partisan power. By contrast, the South Korean politicians have often misused or abused 
81David Marsh, Op. Cit, p. 79 
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the constitution or its revision as if it were their personal political tool to rationalize or 
perpetuate their own political power. 82 
Glaring differences in international and external dimensions also exist between 
Gennany and Korea. To begin with, the Gennan people did not experience the fratricidal 
proxy war in the early 1950s that victimized the Korean people and o1hers. As a result, the 
Korean people both in the North and the South still have a deep-seated and lingering 
mutual distrust, while similar feelings are virtually absent from the minds of the Getman 
people. 
Germany's centerstage position and Korea's periphery, semi-periphery or, at best, 
middle-power status are also noteworthy. Gennany, the claimant of the ttad:itional Mttel 
Europa, the principal actor of both World Wars and the main locomotive of European 
integration, differs sharply :from Korea, the principal victim of both the Sino-Japanese 
(1894-1905) and the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars, World WarD and the Korean 
War, let alone of the Cold War. In this connection, Gwtov's view that "unlike the Getman 
case, where unification was commonly perceived as a direct contn'bution to Europe's long-
term stability and integration, Korean unification may be perceived as destabilizing, even 
potentiaDy 1hreatening, to 1he major powers," is thought provoking. 83 
C. LESSONS 
Korean unification would be somewhat different :from the Gennan case in tenns of 
the political situation. West Gennany alone is the strongest economic power in Western 
Europe with the largest population. The West Getman population is about 62 million, 
while the East Gennan population is about 17 million. 84 A unified Gennany with a 
szsung Chul Yang, Op. Cit., p. 43. 
83The Korean Association oflntemational Studies, "The Trilateral Relationship among South Korea, North 
Korea and the United States", Seoul, Korea, 1 Jtm.e 1992, p. 19. 
84U.S. Department of State, Status ofthe World's Nations, Washinton: GPO, 1983, p.6 
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popula1ion of 80 million is the dominant power in Europe as compared to France (54 
million) and the United Kingdom (56 million). as 
A unified Korea would have a popula1ion of 60 million and a territory of 221,000 
square kilometers. Korea's neighboring countries exceed this size. A unified Korea would 
not be a threat to its neighboring countries. 
Bearing in mind the increasingly tedious nature of the unification question, this 
portion will examine the following two questions in some detail. First, it will identify some 
problems and difficulties stemming from the swift realization of united Germany. In so 
doing, Korea, s1ill a divided land, should maximize the so-called advantages of the late-
comer by learning from the Gennan experiences. Second, by observing and learning from 
the Gennan unification experiences, a new approach to the Korean question is proposed 
here as an alternative to the cummtly existing official and unofficial models and fonnulas 
for the Korean unification. 
The division between South and North Korea has now persisted for more than five 
decades and has been solidified by continuing hostility and confrontation. It causes a 
serious problem because a sense of alienation between the South and North Koreans has 
been growing under the two different political systems and ideologies. 
Since the appearance of major studies on unification by Karl Deutsch86 and Ernst 
Haas87 in the late 1950's, a variety of theories seeking to show how a divided people can 
achieve unification have been developed. Some theorists s1ress the role of either elite or 
mass attitudes; others focus on material conditions, such as levels of communication and 
1rade. Some scholars assign equal weight to the two factors. In Political Unification, Amitai 
Etzioni approaches integration through organization theory. He defines unification as a 
85Ibid., pp. 6-11 
16Kari Deutsh, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957). 
87Emst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958), p. 211. 
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process through which the integration of a system is increased. The question for him is 
what level (or levels) of unit-integration are most conducive to the initiation and 
development of unification. Karl Deutsch speaks of integration as a process leading to the 
creation of secwity communities. He suggests that an intensive pattern of communication 
between individual units w:i11 result in a closer community among the whole units. While 
Deutsch and his students have tended to focus on such low-level phenomena as trade, 
tourist traffic, and news media attention, the concerns of most other scholars have been on 
the use of intergovernmental organizations as facilitators or arenas for joint action. 
Although the main concern of this project is political unification in Korea, I would 
like to outline why a shift :from low levels of interaction between two Koreas to much 
higher levels is needed for Korean reunification and how such a shift might be achieved. 
As we have learned :from Gennan unification, economic exchanges and cooperation can 
greatly contribute to unification. Non-commercial exchanges or grants under favorable 
conditions are especially important for reducing political confrontation. 
South Korea's economic superiority indicates that the unification efforts w:i1l be led 
by the South. Therefore, South Korean authorities must control the private activities of the 
South's films which pursue commercial interests only, and promote economic exchanges 
and cooperation with consistency. Also, North Korea must open its doors to induce South 
Korean capital and technology, because this is the first step to prepare the groundwork for 
the two sides to recover their national homogeneity and to expand inter-Korean economic 
cooperation. 
The fimdamental goal of inter-Korean Economic exchanges and cooperation is to 
upgrade the level of national welfare after unification, by establishing a foWtdation for a 
national community. Therefore, inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation should 
be implemented by consistently taking into account long-nm considerations for restoring 
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peaceful coexistence. Since relations between North and South Korea remain 
confrontational, economic exchanges and cooperation which could lessen the North's 
economic difficulties and contribute to expedite poli1ical reconciliation must receive 
primary importance. 
In the case of the former East and West Gennany, they 1ried to settle disputes in 
accordance with the New York Agreement. South and North Koreas need to establish a 
dispute settlement committee as a subcommittee of "Economic Cooperation Committee. "88 
As we can see in the relationship between West and East Gennany, their cultural 
exchanges were continuously performed and laid the basic foundation for present 
relationship. Thus, infonnal efforts are needed most at this point for Korean situation. I 
expect that Korean unification is an absolute certainty. The political transformation of the 
Korean peninsula, especially the Northern system, may occur at an unexpectedly rapid 
pace such as the Getman unification. 
88Seo, Byong..Chul, "Gong San Kwmm Bung Gwi wa Dok n Tong ll" (Communist Block Collapse and 
German Unification), Seoul Korea Kyechook Publishing. (Oct 1991)p. 67. 
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VI. KOREA : PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS 
A. DILE:M:MAS AND ALTERNATIVES 
1. Internal Problems 
The concept of a confederal system by North Korea contains the same problems as 
does the national conference for unification. Both proposed unacceptable preconditions 
for South Korea. It seems clear that the final objective 
of the North Korean proposals is a communization of the entire Korean nation. More 
concretely, North Korea concentrates first on the withdrawal of United States troops, then 
on carrying out the Communist revolution in South Korea, and finally focuses on 
unification muter Communism. This objective is not merely a conclusion based on research 
of North Korean unification policies, but also continues to be expressed publicly by the 
North Korean authorities. 
The North Korean "peaceful unification" would be quite different from the 
common notion of that concept. It would not be a peaceful unification achieved through 
free elections reflecting the free win of the people. Peaceful unification cannot be on these 
North Korean terms, considering that the South Korean population is more than double 
that of North Korea, and that the standard of living and economic strength of South Korea 
is far greater than that of North Korea. Essentially, North Korean peaceful unification 
means at best a Communist revolution. This cannot be achieved by peaceful means, but 
can only be achieved by force. This intention is seen in brutal incidents such as the 
Rangoon incident of October 1983, which attempted to kill fanner South Korean President 
Chtm but instead killed seventeen members of the presidential delegation. 89 
Peaceful unification 'Will not be achieved simply by the removal of an artificial 
demarcation line through a sudden agreement by both sides, but rather through the 
89Jhe Korea Times.( October 10.1983) 
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homogeneous reconciliation of the two opposing societies. Without this reconciliation of 
two very different societies, unification is not feasible. If some kind of awkward 
unification was temporarily established by some improbable event, it might soon lead to 
another civil war. Therefore, in order to make a viable long-term plan for Korean 
unification, the closed society of North Korea should be carefully studied, and some 
positive measures for opening and changing this society should be taken. In consideration 
of this, the special environment of North Korean society which has evolved for fifty years 
should be analyzed. 
To maintain total control over social Hfe, even domestic travel is severely restricted. 
Travelers must receive permission in advance and apply for food rations and coupons. 
Their itineraries must be approved. Travelers are subject to identification checks on the 
road and at hotels. They should have several identification docwnents such as residence 
cards, ration cards, union or party docwnents and personal identification cards with 
infonnation on employment and marital status and militacy identification. 90 
2. External Problems 
External changes that will confront the two Koreas are equally profound. Korean 
unification should be viewed not only as a domestic issue to be addressed through inter-
Korean political processes, but also as an international issue strongly influenced by the 
complex relationship and conflicting interests of the four major powers-the United States, 
Russia, China, and Japan. To them stability on the Korean peninsula is a dominant 
concern. Consequently, they view the reunification of Korea as a less pressing issue than 
their public pronouncements seem to suggest. They see little chance of reunification in the 
foreseeable future. More importantly, their own national interests are better served by the 
90lJ.S. Department of the Amly, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 215. 
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preservation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Russia has revealed an imp
ressive 
degree of sophistication in its approach to East Asia, demonstrating a skillful use
 of 
diplomatic leverage in addition to military muscle to achieve its political objectives in the 
region. While China continues in its policy of relying on the Western capitalist cowtrie
s, 
the United States and Japan in particular, for capital and technology, it will serio
usly 
attempt to improve relations with the United States and Japan. 
On February 19, 1992, the prime ministers of North and South Korea signed the 
so-called "Basic Agreement between North and South on Reconciliation, Non-aggr
ession, 
and Exchange and Cooperation" along with the "Joint Declaration on De-nucleariza
tion on 
the Korean Peninsula." The treaty commits them to mutual respect for each o
ther's 
political system as they promised when they entered the United Nations. As the w
ords of 
the treaty indicate, the two sides should have negotiated and cooperated inst
ead of 
pursuing policies of confrontation and subversion. Essentially, in my view, so far
 the 
agreement is not worth the paper it is written on. 
All people on the Korean peninsula appear to wish for "Peace," which is certainly a 
conunon concern and could be a basis for value integration. However, the North a
nd the 
South have been diametrically opposed about how to reduce tensions and bring s
tability 
and peace on the peninsula. If both side successfully negotiate and agree upon the follow
-
ups of the Basic Agreement, they are moving a step forward to "Peace".91 
91Prof. K.ang Suk Rhee, "Unification Policy of the Two Koreas : Problems and Prospects" Korean Nat
ional 
Defense College, Seoul, Korea (1992) p. 344. 
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B. SOLUTIONS 
1. Internal Criteria 
11. Democracy II1Ul National Strength 
Korean unification is a difficult and complicated problem 1hat multi-faceted 
efforts for five decades have not been able to resolve. Therefore, there is no clearly 
assmed way of unification. We should try to pursue some feasible means of unification, 
considering all the elements that we have studied. The lack of a clear path does not 
indicate 1hat there is no hope for Korean unification. The rapidly growing economy of 
South Korea is clearly preparing a way for unification. South Koreans do not desire 
unification at any cost but only unification based on a democratic system which guarantees 
a :free market economy and basic human rights. Therefore, when we say "Korean 
unification," the communization of Korea is excluded. 92 
The most important factor in Korean unification is national sttength. 
Peaceful unification is not a unification achieved simply through negotiations without 
considering the national strength of the two sides. The Communists will never resign their 
ambitions unless they are forced to do so. Accordingly, maturity of economic development 
is an absolute prerequisite for Korean unification. Korean unification is a long-range 
national task which cannot be quickly achieved. Social stability is an important prerequisite 
to successfuBy carry out this long-tenn policy. Therefore, vohmtary national wdty should 
be consolidated 1mder the leadership of a strong government. Unfortunately, it is true that 
the Korean people are not satisfactorily politically mature. Social turmoil is a possible 
danger. 
92Yang, Ho-Min and others, "Nam Kwa Bok: Eue Tekae Hanaga Duina" (North and South Korea: The 
Road to Unification) Seoul, Korea, Nanam Publishing House, (1992)pp. 278-279. 
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A strong government should be maintained for a stable society. 
Considering the military confrontation between South and North Korea, a long-term stable 
government is absolutely necessary. 
b. Recognition of tile North Korellll Situation 
The present society of North Korea is a society unique in the world. 
Almost the entire population is 1rained as militaty personnel and organized as a para-
militaty force. The ~ry of North Korea is fortified as a military base. There is no 
freedom of movement for the people. They are kept in the dark about the news armmd 
world. Radio and TV signals are jammed so they carmot receive news from outside their 
COlDltry. For example, they do not even know about the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. All 
telephone nwnbers (public and private) were changed by the North Korean government 
authorities in 1993 in an effort to make it hard for their own people to communicate and 
receive information from other colDltries. 93 Also, food ration control is used as a kind of 
people control measure. The society is totally collectM.zed and mechanized lDlder the 
Communist Party's control Unless this society is changed, Korean unification is not 
feasible. Even if some superficial unification is made, it could lead to another civil war. 
Therefore, before embarking on a program for unification, some practical measures should 
be taken to change North Korean society. 
c. Sollth Korellll Unification ForiiUlla 
Readjustment of the unification phase is necessary. Among the cUITeD.t 
three phases (1st phase : reconciliation and cooperation, 2nd phase : A Korean 
Commonwealth, 3rd phase: A Unified single nation state'f" of unification the first phase 
should be eliminated with the 2nd phase becoming the 1st phase and it would be desirable 
to insert the North Korean's Confederal State phase into the 2nd phase. Since the 
93-Jhe Korea Times (May 26, 1993). 
9otfhe Korea TliDes (Aug. 15, 1994). 
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Confederal State idea is the key issue of the North's Unification formulas, if we insert the 
Confederal State phase, it would be very advantageous to om ability to get North Korea to 
come to the dialogue table for unification. 
Also, a national defense system should be divided into two different 
objectives, national defense against external invasion and national defense in the context of 
South-North Korean relations. Until now the two systems have been confused. However, 
if South Korea wants to actively carry out a program of national unification, the two 
national defense systems should be clearly di&Unguished and reorganized. 
For this, the national defense system against external invasion should be 
organized in alliance with the United States and other fiiendly nations. The present 
national defense system would be in this category. Also, the national defense system in the 
context of South-North Korean relations should be independent of any Allied system. 
National unification can be achieved only through self-reliance and self-detennination. 
National unification is a Korean national problem and should be internationaDy publicized 
as such. 
A dominant role for South Korea is the natural consequence of the above 
argwnents. If unification is a Korean national problem and can be achieved only by self-
reliant efforts, South Korea should take charge of all the responsibilities for the Korean 
question rather than its ally and friendly states. 
To carry out the program of unification, the assmance of non-intervention 
of external powers is absolutely necessary. To obtain this assurance, South Korea must 
persuade all neighboring cowttries that a unified Korea would be best for all. The two 
feasible alternatives of the United States' policy in the Korean question have been explained 
here. Of these two alternatives, a unified Korea in South Korean tenns without any 
foreign forces should be the basic formula for persuading neighboring cowttries. 
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South Korea should be careful in making a long-term foreign policy of 
unification. The East Gennan position, which argued for two Gennanys, should be
 a good 
lesson for South Korea. South Korea should concentrate on keeping
 the universal 
recognition that the Korean nation is only one nation. Until now South Kore
a did almost 
nothing to advance a change. South Korea should quickly take the offensive 
and cmy out 
active measmes to change the NoJ1h Korean totalitarian collective society. Of
 course, it is 
difficult to penetrate a thoroughly closed society like North Korea. It is also 
true that the 
more closed a society, the more vulnerable it is to external cultures and sys
tems. Thus, 
South Korea should urgently study this issue. 
The South-North Korean dialogue is very important for several reasons. It 
offers an effective means to change North Korean society and at the sam
e time prevent 
foreign intervention .in the Korean question, emphasimtg that Korean unifi
cation is being 
canied out by the Koreans themselves. Therefore, South Korea should 
encourage its 
progress. 
d Nortll 111Jd Soldll K oreiiiJ SIUIUIIit Talks 
"North Korea's basic strategy is they don't want to talk with South Korea," 
said Cha Young Koo, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense
 Analysis in 
Seoul "They need an enemy, still, for the stability of their regime. "93 
North Korean leaders do not want South and North Korea to be unified 
unless it is on Pyongyang's tenn. In South Korea, unification implies no d
efinitive and 
absolute goals; it is vague at worst and open-ended at best. At the sa
me time, a 
governmental-academic unification complex, resembling a 1hriving business ente
rprise, has 
emerged. A ministcy supervising the unification question was created (National Unification 
Board). Scholars and experts specia1i7ing on this topic haw multiplied. Jownals, papers, 
9.5-J:be New Yorlc Times (October 20. 1994) p. A4. 
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books and pamphlets, as wen as conferences and seminars, have flooded the Korean 
inteHectual market Also, unification research institutes off and on campus and civic 
organizations at home and abroad, some of which are supported or subsidized by the 
public sources, have also mushroomed. In this regard, North Korea has been pursuing 
much the same course, except that all these are more Ullifonnly directed and controned by 
the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). 
Thus far, both sides' approaches to Wlification have ammmted to nothing 
more than a war of words. While they are engaged in this war of words, the reality of 
division persists, and the ideal of Wlification remains unrealized. The ini1ial step in the 
unification process, I believe, would be a meeting between the leaders of the North and 
South governments. Without this interim measw-e neither side can move toward 
unification. 
2. Ertemal Criteria 
11. PeniUISion by tile Folll' Power Co'llllllies 
The neighboring COW11ries of Korea would like to see the status quo 
maintained in the Korean peninsula. This does not imply that they would oppose any 
Korean unification. If they prefer the status quo in Korea, it is simply because they fear 
the uncertainty of a unified Korea in the context of their national interests and the risk of 
involvement in another Korean war. 
In this sense, it would be useful to study the traditional American policy for 
Korean unification. As explained above, the United States' policy for Korean unification 
has been based on two feasible alternatives:96 (1) a Korea divided for an indefinite period 
on the present demarcation line wi1h South Korea tied into the United States security 




system and developed as a military aDy; -or (2) a Wlffied, neutralized Korea 1mder the 
leadership of a substantiaDy unchanged South Korea. 
The current basic agreement between the South and North is supposedly in 
effect, but due to the Jack of: (1) mutual agreement by both the South and North National 
assemblies, (2) notification to the U.N., and (3) verification by the four main powers, it 
appears to be an agreement without substance. To be effective, it must be confirmed by 
the powers. 
The United States, Japan, China and Russia should provide substantial 
evidence of their support of unification on the peninsula. The leaders of the four coWttries 
always use every opportunity that arises to express their "desire for security on the Korean
 
peninsula" but so far we have seen no actions to back up their words. So, in other words, 
it might not be incorrect to say that they actually would prefer the situation to remain just 
as it is. Even with the end of the Cold War, this attitude has not changed. This kind of 
attitude is advantageous to the North's policy (not really wanting a balanced form of 
unification) and it impacts negatively on the South's desire for Wlffication. 
b. Collective Seclllity SysUm 
A new security vision 'Will have a dual goal of managing the geopolitical 
balance of power inherited from the past as well as the emerging interdependence that will 
increase in the future. Therefore, it is a very important to develop a variety of multilateral 
regimes and institutions to organize the collective action of states for coping with the 
transnational agenda. 97 
In post-World War ll alliance and integration frameworlcs, Germany has 
been involved in multilateral arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 
(NATO), the European Community (EC) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
97Dr. JosephS. Nye, Jr. "American Strategy after the Cold War", The Forth Series of the Inchon Mem
orial 
Lecture, Korea Univ. (Nov. 12, 1990)pp. 56-58. 
70 
Europe (CSCE). The South Korean security alliance and external relations have been, on 
the other hand, primarily bilateral, e.g., the 1954 U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense 
Treaty. In recent years, some multilateral arrangements are in the offing in Korea and its 
region, too, but they are still in their embryonic stages. The launching of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the proposal of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), as a counterpart of the CSCE, are the cases in point.98 
The lack of a NATO-like structure in Asia strengthened the United States' 
ability to manipulate the two Northeast Asian allies, weakened their ability to recognize the 
consequences of U.S. policy, and greatly intensified the meaning of containment during the 
Cold War. Because of the persistence of certain Cold War - like circmnstances in the 
Northeast Asia region, these relationships are not just of historical interest as is true of the 
German - Soviet example of double containment. In Asia double-containment is fully 
fimction in the 1990s. As the Cold War ended in this context, Korean nuclear options and 
prospects that a unified Korea might emerge as a rival for Japan renewed Japanese 
anxieties. 99 
Because of the crisis which developed over the possible development of 
nuclear weapons by North Korea, Japanese anxieties are multifold. Not only does Japan 
fear a posstble nuclear attack which in large part would result from sanctions leveled 
against the North, but Japan must face the scrutiny of the world community concerning 
weapons-grade material on Japanese soil as wen as its anti-Korean racist policies toward 
some 680,000 Koreans living in Japan. 
98Ibid. pp. 43-48 
99or. Edward Olsen and Dr. David B. W"mterford "Asian Multilateralism : Implications for U.S. Policy," The 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense .Analysis, vol. VI, No. 1 (Summer 1994) 
pp. 17-19 
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c. United States- North Korea Agreement 
The accord between the United States and North Korea outlines an 
elaborate timetable for steps by each side that would end in the complete dismantling of 
North Korea's nuclear program in about ten years, according to details disclosed October 
21, 1994. American officials acknowledge that the agreement will require enonnous 
patience and perseverance for the United States and its allies. And they concede that it 
poses a risk for much of the next decade that North Korea could change its mind, cast 
aside the accord and have the basic fuel in hand to produce nuclear weapons. 100 
Under the accord, North Korea would agree to allow full and continuous 
inspections of its existing nuclear sites, freeze and then later dismantle some of its key 
nuclear plants and ultimately ship out of the cotmtry fuel rods that could be converted into 
weapons. But the agreement also allows North Korea to keep those rods for an unspecified 
nwnber of years. This provision means that North Korea could break its agreements and 
quickly produce nuclear weapons if it is prepared to run the consequent risks. The 
agreement, a first in diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea, is 
indeed a significant milestone. Conversely, the agreement itself does not, in the short tenn, 
preclude North Korea's ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. Consequently, the 
proximate result of the agreement rests upon the intentions of the North Korean leadership. 
Should North Korea abide by the agreement, this will be a major step toward entrance into 
the international comrm.mity while having a most positive impact upon future developments 
and tmification. 
lOOfb.e New York Times (Oct. 19. 1994) 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. POLICY DISPARITIES RESULTING FROM DIFFERENCES 
Reality is such that a look at the unification policy bases and ideas of the South and 
the North shows differences only, with ahnost nothing in common. Seen thus, it is not 
totally umeasonable to regard unification on the Korean peninsula as next to impossible. 
The root cause lies in the fact that the two sides' ideologies and systems are different; there 
exists a disparity in the basic framework within which each intetp1ets history and perceives 
the social and international environment M~, the two sides underwent a fratricidal 
war which only served to deepen their mutual distrust.1o1 
In short, North Korea sticks to a wrification policy based on the concept of 
"revolution." "classes" and "struggles" because it believes in the inevitability of the collapse 
of capitaJism. South Korea dwells on diverse views of values incidental to an open society 
instead of a single closed view of values because it subscn"bes to h'beral democracy as its 
political ideology, and maintains a capitalist system. The South is sure in the conviction 
that a closed society can never successfu]ly lead industrialization and democratization. and 
that, therefore, the North Korean system win not be able to hold on to its closed state 
indefinitely. 
The South believes that the senses of class, struggles and revolution on the part of 
the North Koreans win weaken before long. and that it is only a matter of time before 
North Korean society undergoes a change as the trend of world histoty flows toward anti-
totalitarianism. It is from this stance that the South calls for unification under a single state 
by holding general elections under democra1ic methods and procedures. The South's idea 
is that before accomplishing unification, a Korean Commonwealth, or perhaps the North 
Korean proposed confederal state, should be created dwing the interim stage, through 
101y1ID, Yang-Tack, "Jae Sam eui Tong ll Bang An"(A Third.Altemative for Unification), Seoul, Korea: 
Mae-ll Economic Daily News press, (1993), p. 217-218. 
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national reconciliation and the restoration of trust prompted by phased exchanges and 
cooperation. 
Differences in ideologies and systems between the two sides thus led to a disparity 
in their interpretation of histoty, which in tum set off differences in the ways of perceiving 
each other's society, as wen as international society. Such differences in the ways of 
perception, meanwhile, have inevitably brought about a disparity in their unification 
policies. As a result, the reality oftoday's inter-Korean relations is that the disparity in their 
unification policies has made it almost impossible for the two sides to cany on their 
dialogue on a practical basis.1oz 
Today, world countries, transcending differences in ideologies and systems, pursue 
reconciliation in gaining national interests and economic prosperity. In order for the two 
Koreas to transcend their differences in ideologies and systems, a change in the flow of the 
national history of Korea is necessary. 
Therefore, the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea can no longer 
live only on the contradictions based on optimism about a change in each other's systems. 
Rather, they find themselves in a situation where they must readjust themselves by 
accommodating such a requirement. If so, the justness and reasonableness of the 
unification policies of the two sides can be determined depending on which one of the two 
policies has positively accommodated such internal and external changes and which one is 
in line with the flow of world and national histories. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNIFICATION ISSUE 
North Korea only responds to the request for dialogue when it serves their political 
purposes. But this is only a scheme to buy more time to cany out their ulterior pwposes. 
102Rho, Cb.an-Baek and others, "Naeng Jun who K.uk Ka Tong ll"(The Post Cold War National 
Unification), Seoul, Korea: Yejin Publishing, (1993), p. 117. 
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In the final analysis, the basic philosophy behind South Korea's quest for unification is also 
centered on the value of freedom and democracy. W"rth finn faith in democracy and on 
the strength of the independent abilities of our nation, we must strive harder to overcome 
the lingering remnants of the Cold War and end the tenitoria1 division in order to achieve 
the long cherished goal of peaceful unification without fail. 103 Unification should be 
achieved on our own according to the wishes of our people and by virtue of our inherent 
national capabilities. 
I think the reality of the international community is such that no intennedialy exists 
who can coordinate the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea. Besides, the 
Koreans cannot delegate the task of unification to world powers, nor is there a party that 
can make a fair judgment. Instead, the two sides, with finn confidence in the direction of 
the flow of history, must :first promote a stage where they can openly discuss issues, from 
the standpoint of brotherly love and pool their wisdom in working out an accord on matters 
of mutual concern. To this end, the two sides should depart from the residual Cold War era 
confrontation and promote a dialogue for co-existence and co-prosperity. At the same 
time, an international environment conducive thereto should persist for a protracted period. 
Of course, today's North Korea is not in a condition to undergo resolute openness 
and refonns like the fmmer Soviet Union and East European countries have. We can 
hardly expect any radical openness and refonns because the North has yet to root a 
hereditaJy power succession system, and because of the fear of the coUapse of its system as 
a result of sweeping openness and refOilllS. The North Koreans' craving for a better 
economic standard of Jiving is getnng stronger. To resolve the issue, there is no other 
choice but to introduce both capital and knowhow from the outside world. 
1°3President Kim. Young-Sam's 1994 Liberation Day Speech, Seoul, Korea. (August 15.1994) 
15 
Under the circumstances, the North's leadership will cautiously promote openness 
but will actually tJy to promote public support for its hereditary power succession system. 
However, such guarded openness is bowtd to lead to sweeping openness, due to the vitality 
and logic of the concept of openness itself. With regard to its tmification policy, openness 
would significantly wtdennine the basis on which the North perpetuates in political 
propaganda and fictitious logic. 
In the long nut, the dialogue would make the North Korean people aware of reality 
and request that their leadership open Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
society to a higher standard of living, even to political freedom. Such a change would 
obviously be the cause of the collapse of North Korea's regime. Therefore, Pyongyang has 
been reluctant to continue the dialogue, at times unilaterally postponing or suspending it. 
The tum of the international situation toward a new order affects, in an absolutely 
favorable manner, the efforts of the Koreans to overcome their division. The international 
trend toward reconciliation and cooperation, transcending systems and ideologies, already 
necessitates inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation. The changes in Eastern 
European cowttries, which are putting an end to the Communist system, demand a change 
from North Korea in its policy to strengthen the "three revolutionary abilities" and the 
unification policy based thereon. The end of the Cold War system on the international 
level demands an end to the Cold War mechanism on the Korean peninsula.I04 
H' North Korean society has no choice but to be changed in the direction of 
openness and reforms, the improvement of inter-Korean relations would become a matter 
of time. H' and when inter-Korean relations improve, the tmification issue will be resolved 
through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation on the basis of the reality of division. The 
fact that the openness and refonn of fanner East Gennany has made possible the rapid 
104Koh, Byung Chul, "A Comparative Study of Unification Plans :The Korean National Conum.mity 
Versus the Koryo Confederation." Korea Observer 21 (Winter 1990), p. 67. 
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improvement of inter-Gennan relations and Gennan UDifica1ion provides the Koreans with 
a means 1hrough which they can assess the direction of the resolution of their own 
unification issue. 
In swn, South Korea has continuaBy proposed a step-by-step unifica1ion plan, but 
from the viewpoint of futurology and the social sciences, lDlexpectedly rapid change could 
occur.tos Rather than worrying about whether UDifica1ion will occur or not, futurologists 
are more concerned about how to prepare for UDifica1ion and how the features of a unified 
Korea will correspond to the global historical processes. Under the present circumstances, 
it is important to find ways in which the South and North can coexist and prosper together. 
On the basis of such a prosperity, the two societies can be integrated into one prosperous 
nation. 
C. KOREA'S DESTINY : IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. - KOREAN RELATIONS 
Korean wtifica1ion would no doubt resolve considerable tensions not only on the 
Korean peninsula but in the entire Asia-Pacific region. However, it would also introduce 
new tensions as well. In China and Japan "Neighbor" anxiety to a combined Korean 
militaly threat and nuclear weapons on the peninsula nms high as wen as unease over a 
United Korea's potential as an economic rival. Korean unification is a regional security 
issue that will depend on continued reasonably good relations in the Asia-Pacific region. If 
not reunited with the South, the North, increasingly isolated, will continue to develop and 
rely on militaiy power combined with nuclear capability to assert itself in the region. In 
near economic collapse the only alternative for the North is to expand (by force) in the 
hope of revitaJimJg its nearly destroyed economy and depleted resources. This expansion 
would lDldoubtedly escalate throughout the region as well as the world. 
1°.5Lee, Hong Koo, "How Shall We Prepare for the Future ofKorea?" in Korea Focus Seoul, Korea, Vol. 1, 
No.4, (1993), pp. 67-70. 
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In order for America to promote regional stability and an open Asia-Pacific region 
it will have to help organize it. A much needed regional security dialogue which could lead 
to a more cooperative future for the region could result from unification. However, the 
United States' regional strategy must emphasize Korea's importance in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The United States, however, must also plan for the posstbility of disruption rather 
than stabilization of the region as a result of Korean unification. Not only would the 
United States be a central player in Korean unification but China would as wen. 
Improperly handled unification could result in political turmoil that could drive a wedge 
between the two great powers. No matter the outcome, the prospect of unification bas 
already involved complex regional diplomacy involving the United States, Russia, Japan 
and China as wen as North and South Korea. Once the nuclear issue is settled, the difficult 
and the complex issues of unification and Korea's future security alignments will unfold.1
06 
100fhomas L. McNaugher, " Reforging Northeast Asia's dagger? U.S. Strategy and Korean Unification," 
Brookings Review. Swnrner 1993, Vol 11, No.3, p. 16. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS (1992) 
Unit 
Population 1000 
Population growth rate % 
Area 1000km2 
GNP $bn 
GNP per capita $ 
Real growth rate % 
Military spending $bn 
Ratio of military 
spending to GNP % 
Ratio of military 
spending to budget % 
Cuhivated acreage mil.ha 
rice paddies mil.ha 
Grain products mil. tons 
nee mil.tons 
com mil. tons 
Rice output per unit kg/10 acre 
Marine products mil. tons 
Iron ore mil. tons 
Pig iron mil. tons 
Steel mil.tons 




Aluminium 1000 tons 
Automobiles 1000 
Shipbuilding mil.grt 





























































APPENDIX B. MILITARY CAPABILTIY OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTII 
C1asslfication South Korea North Korea 
Army 540,000 900,000 
Troops Navy 60,000 46,000 
Air Force 55,000 84,000 
Total 655,000* 1,030,000** 
Ground Force 
<Unit> Corps 11 17 
Divisions SO*** 53 
Brigades 21 99 
<Equipment> 
Tanks 1,800 3,800 
Armored vehicles 1,900 2,500 
Field artillery 4,500 10,300 
Naval Force 
Force Combatants 190 434 
Support vessels 60 310 
Submarines 1 26 
Air Force 
Tactical aircraft 520 850 
Support aircraft 190 480 
Helicopters 600 290 
* excludes those enlisted for defense call-up, and includes Marine Corps troops 
within the Navy 
** the Marine Corps troops who are organized into the Army are included in the 
Army 
*** includes Marine Corps divisions 
* Source: Defense White Paper 1993-1994 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
American Military Government 
Asian Pacific Economic Commwlity 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ConsultAtive Conference for National Reunification 
Christian Democratic Union 
Combined Forces Command 
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland 
Conference on Secmity and Cooperation in Asia 
Conference on Secmity and Cooperation in Europe 
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo 
Deutsch Malt 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
European Economic Community 
Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Gennan Democratic Republic 
Gross National Product 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Korean Central News Agency 
Korean National Community Unification Formula 
Ministry of National Defense 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
People's Republic of China 
Republic of Korea 
Social Democratic Party 
United Nations 
United Nations Command 
United States 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Worker's Party of Korea 
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